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INTRODUCTION
The principle of discontinuity in the consideration of legislative
bills is widely accepted in democratic countries. This principle
requires incoming parliaments to begin the work of legislation anew.
Bills pending from the previous legislature die due to elections. In
contrast, the rule of continuity means that, if a bill passed the first
reading in an outgoing parliament, the incoming parliament may
decide that it will continue the deliberations on the bill at the point
where the previous parliament left off. Thus, the incoming parliament
will not hold anew a first reading on the pending bill.
In comparative law, legislative discontinuity is the prevailing
norm in both presidential and parliamentary systems.1 Some
constitutional systems enable exceptions to the principle of
discontinuity, including Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, and Spain. Only a few exceptional constitutional systems
adopted the opposite rule of de facto continuity, such as the EU
parliament, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Israel. The rare
1. Jan Van Schagen, The Principle of Discontinuity and the Efficiency of the Legislative
Process, 3 J. LEGAL STUD. 115 (1997).
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exceptions to the principle of discontinuity often reflect the difficulty
of enacting a law during the life of one parliament in a bicameral
system. But Israeli law does not fit this comparative rationale. The
Israeli legislature (“Knesset”), which is composed of only one house
of parliament, employs the rule of continuity on a regular basis.2
Why was the legislative discontinuity principle so widely
preferred over its opposite? There is virtually no literature dealing
with this principle and its implications have not been rigorously
explored.3 One could infer from the dearth of research and interest in
the subject that this principle is insignificant.4 But this Article argues
that this seemingly technical principle should be regarded as one of
democracy’s major tenets. Its opposite rule of continuity detracts from
the meaning of representative democracy. This Article presents a
critical analysis of the Israeli Continuity Law. By doing so, the
Article explores the contribution of legislative discontinuity to the
democratic world. The Article may contribute to recent US debates
regarding whether to treat the Senate as a continuing body,5 to recent
British endeavors to insert flexibility to their rigid discontinuity
principle,6 and to attempts to minimize the democratic deficit of the
EU Parliament.7
Israeli society is accustomed to the phenomenon of continuity in
legislative deliberations. However, some of the founding fathers in
the 1960s understood the importance of legislative discontinuity and
fought vigorously to protect it. Parliament’s debates in those
formative years on the subject of continuity are among the most
fascinating ever held by the membership on constitutional issues. This
Article attempts to convey the “atmosphere” of the discussions on
these different perspectives and to reveal the behind-the-scenes
dynamics as they emerge from the files in the State’s archives.
2. See infra Part III.
3. “We have found that very little research is done in this field. Many constitutional
textbooks completely ignore the existence of the principle. If it is mentioned, the effect on the
legislative process is hardly ever considered.” Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 117, 123. In
Israel, there is only one laconic article on the subject. See Ora Schmalz, On the Law of
Continuity of Debate on Draft Laws, 1964, 2 ISR. L. REV. 566 (1967).
4. Van Schagen assumes that the discontinuity principle does not raise significant
challenges, because the governments in countries in which it applies generally have significant
influence over the parliamentary agenda and schedule. Thus, governments can pass legislation
despite the discontinuity principle. Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 124.
5. See infra Part V.E.
6. See infra Part III.C.3.
7. See infra Part III.C.2.
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In fact, the core of the debate was on the nature of the
legislature. Continuity supporters sought to ascribe to the legislature
perpetuity similar to an artificial body. Their arguments were
unintentionally based on an age-old philosophical-religious tradition,
which sought to attribute to a king, as sovereign, both the mortal
natural body and the eternal artificial body. Upon the death of the
natural body, sovereignty passes to the new natural body of the heir,
but continuity is maintained because the artificial body is immortal.
These ideas were later superimposed on parliament, as the new
embodiment of the sovereign. Accordingly, the composition of
individual members changes, but the continuity of parliament is
preserved.8 Therefore, elections should not affect the work of
legislation.
The opposite perspective places sovereignty in the hands of the
constituents. The essence of democracy is that the continuity of
sovereignty rests with the people, not with their representatives. In
day-to-day matters, the people’s sovereignty is manifested in the real
power of constituents to influence the content of laws by breaking the
legislative continuity and electing new representatives.
This Article analyzes the arguments for and against continuity.
Proponents of continuity have argued that it promotes legislative
efficiency and is especially necessary in light of instability of
government rule. Continuity diminishes the effects of frequent and
lengthy duration of caretaker governments in Israel. Continuity also
enables the State to undertake major legislative enterprises, such as
codifying law and adopting a Constitution. They view the legislature
as a deciding, rather than a deliberative, body. They promote a
formalistic perception of democracy based on majority rule.9 They
thoroughly scour comparative law to find precedents that may support
continuity.
This Article discusses three types of arguments against
continuity, at times citing Members of Knesset (“MKs”) who opposed
continuity. A first line of argument is comparative. This Article shows
how Israel’s precedents in support of continuity paradoxically do not
lend such support. This story is fascinating as it reveals how
comparative law played an influential role in Israel in the 1960s and
affected the political actors’ decision regarding continuity.
8. See, e.g., ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING’S TWO BODIES: A STUDY IN
MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY (1957).
9. See infra Part II.
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A second line of argument is constitutional. It asserts that
continuity disproportionately infringes upon constitutional rights.10
The Article analyzes how continuity diminishes the meaning of
elections, since voters’ actions do not properly influence the
legislative agendas. By preventing members of parliament (“MPs”)
from enjoying full power to consider bills, continuity deprives them
of their right to participate in a proper legislative process. The
infringement of members’ right of deliberation has the greatest impact
on new members and on any minority group that oppose laws to
which continuity has been applied. Furthermore, by shackling one
legislature to the legislative decisions of its predecessor, continuity
results in a prohibited transfer of legislative authority. Moreover,
continuity removes or at least weakens the restraints of veto and delay
(“veto-gates”) that are otherwise available to the minority in
parliament. As a result, the power of the government to enact laws
increases in tandem with a weakening in the status of individual
members, factions, and even legislative committees.11
A third line of argument is normative and essentially posits that
Israeli proponents of continuity erred in thinking that it would
increase efficiency. They may have opportunistically enacted
continuity during the only time parliament’s turnover was negligible.
They also misled opponents by asserting that continuity would not be
applied to controversial laws. They erred as well in considering
continuity to be an appropriate means for enacting Basic Laws—i.e.,
Israel’s Constitution—or a suitable tool for dealing with the problem
of multiple caretaker governments in Israel.12 In fact, because
caretaker governments suffer from severe democratic deficit and
agency problems, they should not enjoy enhanced legislative power.
Moreover, continuity is used strategically to leverage
governmental power over legislation in Israel. This Article describes
the different techniques by which the government may create an
artificial majority using continuity to enact laws. These techniques
include enacting laws in bundles and by reference, as well as
manipulating the date of the bill’s submission for the first reading and
the date continuity is applied. The government sometimes even
attempts to dictate the contents of the bill, by conditioning its consent
to continuity, initiated by the Knesset’s committees, on the drafting of
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part IV.F.
12. See infra Part V.
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specific provisions. All this is done behind the scenes without the
government providing a full account of its actions to the plenum or to
the public.13 This Article concludes that the harms arising from
continuity outweigh the benefits.
The constitutional and the normative lines of argument
supplement each other. By highlighting continuity’s many
infringements on constitutional rights and values, the constitutional
argument gives substance to the normative cost-benefit argument
against continuity. The normative argument shows that the added
benefit to social interests is marginal and thus cannot offset the harm
to constitutional rights and values resulting from continuity. As such,
the Israeli Continuity Law does not pass the constitutional test of
proportionality.14 Although both lines of argument supplement each
other, the normative argument stands on its own. Thus, even if the
Continuity Law had been enacted as part of Israel’s Constitution, it
would have been inappropriate to do so on the normative grounds that
the Law’s drawbacks outweigh its advantages.
Part One traces the history of the enactment of the Israeli
Continuity Law. Part Two analyzes the considerations that favor
enacting continuity, as put forward by its proponents. Part Three
reveals how comparative law played a major part in Israel’s debate
over whether to adopt continuity. It shows that comparative law did
not and still does not support the adoption of the rule of continuity as
the operative norm of a constitutional system, the opinions of Israeli
Ministers of Justice notwithstanding. Part Four demonstrates how
continuity infringes upon constitutional rights and values. Thus, even
assuming that all the many advantages cited in Part Two are correct,
Part Four argues that it is doubtful whether continuity passes tests of
constitutionality. Part Five presents another line of argument against
the enactment of continuity on normative grounds. It suggests that,
even disregarding the constitutional objections enumerated in Part
Four and taking the arguments of the Law’s proponents in their own
right, continuity does not withstand scrutiny. Part Six suggests that, if
the Knesset is interested in the continued existence of the continuity
rule, it must enact the rule as part of Israel’s Constitution rather than
as an ordinary law. Further, were the Knesset to enact continuity as a

13. See infra Part V.B.
14. AHARON BARAK, PROPORTIONALITY: CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND THEIR
LIMITATIONS, 340-70 (David Dyzenhaus & Adam Tomkins eds., Doron Kalir trans., 2012).
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constitutional norm, it should limit its use to consensual laws, as was
originally intended.
I. HISTORY OF ENACTMENT OF CONTINUITY LAW
Three principal stages can be identified in the development of
Israel’s rule of continuity. In the first stage (1948-1964), the Knesset
consciously rejected this rule and adopted the principle of legislative
discontinuity. In the second stage (1964-1979), the Knesset permitted
continuity while leaving the principle of legislative discontinuity as
the default. During these years, only the government could initiate the
application of continuity. Subsequently (1979-present), the Knesset
committees were also granted power, along with the government, to
initiate the application of continuity, but only in relation to nongovernment bills.
A. Origins of the Continuity Rule
In the First Knesset, MK Nir-Rafalkes proposed the rule of
continuity for Knesset debates on bills, but his suggestion was
rejected.15 In the Third Knesset, he teamed up with MK Harari, and
together they proposed to amend Basic Law: The Knesset to include
continuity. The amendment they presented would have automatically
applied continuity to all bills that passed the first reading in the
outgoing Knesset unless the incoming Knesset decided otherwise.16
The Knesset rejected the proposal by a majority of twenty-six to
twenty-one MKs.17
After a failed attempt in the Fourth Knessst,18 MK Nir-Rafalkes
submitted the bill a third time in the Fifth Knesset,19 and, unlike the
two previous occasions, the government embraced the idea of
continuity and in 1961 submitted a bill of its own.20
The Fifth Knesset intensely debated MK Nir-Rafalkes’ bill and it
was ultimately voted down, because some members categorically
opposed continuity.21 Since Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen tied the
success of the government’s bill to the success of MK Nir-Rafalkes’
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

32 DK 116 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Nir-Rafalkes).
Explanatory notes to the Bill, 25 DK 1013 (1958) (Isr.).
25 DK 999 (1958) (Isr.).
31 DK 1929 (1961) (Isr.).
32 DK 43 (1962) (Isr.).
Continuity of Knesset Debates Bill,1961, HH 8 (Isr.); 32 DK 106 (1961) (Isr.).
32 DK 147 (1961) (Isr.).
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private bill, the Justice Minister simultaneously withdrew the
government’s bill on the subject.22
B. Enactment of the First Continuity Law
In that same Fifth Knesset, the Government succeeded in
initiating and enacting the Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1964.23
This law reflected the following principles: first, only the Government
constituted after elections was authorized to initiate the application of
continuity, not private MKs or any Knesset committee; second, the
Government could initiate the application of continuity to both
governmental and private bills; third, in the absence of an objection,
continuity would apply without any discussion or vote; and fourth, in
case of an objection, discussion of the objection would be limited to
one representative of each position, after which a vote would be held
on the objection.
Private members proposed an amendment in 1979 intended to
expand the authority to initiate the application of continuity.
According to the amendment, both Knesset committees and private
members who submitted bills would be able to initiate the application
of continuity—the latter only with the agreement of the Knesset
committee overseeing the bill.24 In practice, the authority to initiate
the application of continuity was extended to Knesset committees
solely with respect to non-government bills. Private MKs were not
given authority to initiate the application of continuity.25
C. The Current Continuity Law
In 1993, the Continuity of Debate on Bills Law was enacted at
the urging of Ma’arach Party MK Hagai Merom, who was then
chairman of the Knesset Committee.26 The law introduced several
innovations which are still active today. First, continuity cannot be
applied to a private member’s bill without the agreement of the bill’s
sponsor. Hence, at least one consenting sponsor of any private bill has
22. Id.; see also Correspondence of the Director of the Legislation Division in the Justice
Ministry Dr. U. Yadin to Justice Minister Dov Yosef, May 19, 1963, State Archive GL21275/12.
23. Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1964, SH 2 (Isr.); see also Continuity of Debate
on Bills Bill, 1964, HH 88 (Isr.).
24. See Continuity of Debate on Bills Bill (Amendment No. 2), 1979, HH 124 (Isr.).
25. See Continuity of Debate on Bills Law (Amendment No. 2), 1979, SH 116 (Isr.).
26. See Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993, SH 60 (Isr.).
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to be a member of the Knesset in which the continuity rule is applied.
Second, the law requires a vote to be held on the application of
continuity even if no objection was made. Third, the new law requires
the committee to give advance notice to the Government of the
committee’s intention to request continuity, to enable the Government
to respond prior to the discussion in the committee. It further grants
the Government the right to object to the application of continuity in
the Knesset plenum.27 It should be emphasized that, even after the
enactment of the Continuity Law, discontinuity remained the default.
II. THE NORMATIVE CASE FOR CONTINUITY
In the 1960s, the Knesset intensely debated the principle of
legislative discontinuity. This Part presents the normative arguments
raised at that time in support of the rule of continuity.
A. Efficiency
MKs Nir-Rafalkes and Harari, the authors of the idea of
continuity, justified it as a way of saving the Knesset time and work.28
Similarly, in 1964, when the Government proposed the Continuity
Law, it explained:
Experience shows that at the end of the term of office of an
outgoing Knesset, government bills remain on which
deliberations were begun but not completed. In the new Knesset
it is necessary to resubmit these bills and to repeat stages of the
deliberations that already took place in the outgoing Knesset. In
many cases this involves needless repetition.29

The proponents of the law believed that continuity was
especially necessary to preserve the work of the committees.30 They
argued that the law was justified to avoid “wasting Knesset’s time and
to prevent a group of members from sabotaging the committees and
dragging out laws endlessly.”31 They also asserted that continuity
would enable the Knesset to more seriously fulfill its other functions,
such as supervising the Government and the budget.32
27. See Continuity of Debate on Bills Bill, 1993, HH 49 (Isr.).
28. 25 DK 997 (1959) (Isr.).
29. Explanatory notes to Continuity of Debate on Bills Bill, 1964, HH 88 (Isr.); see also
39 DK 1602 (1964) (Isr.).
30. 39 DK 1609 (1964) (MK Baruch Azanya); 39 DK 1616 (MK Yitzhak Klinghoffer).
31. 32 DK 116 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Nir-Rafalkes).
32. 39 DK 1615 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yitzhak Klinghoffer).
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B. Caretaker Governments
Proponents argued that the need for continuity is stronger when
the Knesset is dissolved before the end of its term. In such
circumstances, the Knesset is unable to plan ahead, to complete the
handling of bills pending before it.33 In fact, the timing of the
proposal of the Continuity Law was influenced by the Israeli
Governments’ instability.34
On October 23, 1961, the same day on which MK Nir-Rafalkes’
bill was rejected and the Government bill to adopt continuity was
withdrawn, the Knesset considered an amendment to the Transition
Law, which, in substance, was intended to limit the time available to a
prime ministerial candidate to set up a Government. The amendment
required the President of the State to attempt to prevent elections by
reaching out to more than one candidate to set up a Government if the
first candidate failed in this task.35 MKs Nir-Rafalkes, Yitzhak
Klinghoffer, and Moshe Unna, who were the key figures supporting
the Continuity Law, were the ones to propose the amendment to the
Transition Law.36 These MKs had at that time two central concerns—
to offer proper treatment to caretaker governments and to ensure
continuity of Knesset debates. The regulation of each was intended to
complement the other.
The eleventh Government of Israel enacted the Continuity Law
of 1964. This was the second Government to serve during the term of
the Fifth Knesset after its predecessor had resigned. One of the first
initiatives of this Government was to promote continuity. In response,
Religious Affairs Minister Zerach Warhaftig, who was firmly
opposed to continuity, wrote to the Government Secretary in July 16,
1963:
I believe that dealing with the matter at the present time is
inappropriate in terms of public policy, since consideration of
this bill, on an urgent basis, two weeks after the new government
was constituted, might give the public the impression that the

33. 39 DK 1603 (1964) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Dov Yosef). Support for this position can
be found in Swedish law wherein bills die only when Parliament completes its full term of four
years, but not if Parliament is dissolved. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 118.
34. State Archive GL-21275/12.
35. 32 DK 147-50 (1962) (Isr.).
36. MKs Gross, Riftin, and Shofman initiated the amendment to the Transition Law as
well. Id.

398

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:387

new government is unsure of its stability and it is preparing the
background for new elections.37

Warhaftig saw the Government’s failure to put this bill through
the usual procedures as an expression of the “pressure” felt by the
Government to pass the bill before it fails.38 Warhaftig was justified
in his criticism to a certain extent, since one of the last things the
eleventh Government managed to do was pass the Continuity Law.39
The initiators of the Continuity Law sought to find a remedy not
only to the instability of Israel’s Governments, but also to the
standing of the Knesset in the last year of its tenure. They argued that
it was unthinkable that the Knesset should not be able to submit new
bills in the last year of its tenure.40 Until the Continuity Law, the
Knesset sometimes refrained from tabling bills towards the end of its
term of office, when it appeared that the bills would not pass through
all the legislative stages and Knesset work would be for naught.41
C. Codification Enterprise
When MKs Nir-Rafalkes and Harari, and subsequently Justice
Minister Pinchas Rosen proposed continuity between 1959 and 1961,
they justified it mainly “with respect to technical laws.”42 By
technical laws, they meant laws entailing a great amount of work in
the committees.43 They were thinking of bills “that are not subject to
factional dispute in the Knesset.”44
Similarly, Justice Minister Dov Yosef justified the Continuity
Law in 1964 by Israel’s need for many legal codes that would
rejuvenate old laws from the Mandatory and Ottoman periods. As
examples, he pointed to three codes that were pending before the Fifth
Knesset that might not be finalized before the next election, namely:
37. See State Archive GL–21275/12.
38. See id. (correspondence from July 16, 1963). For discussion of the regular legislative
process regarding government bills that the government circumvented, see infra note 146.
39. The Knesset passed the law on November 10, 1964, and the government’s term
ended on December 22, 1964. The Fifth Knesset passed the law and this particular Knesset
was characterized by government instability, with three governments serving during its fouryear tenure. See Governments since the Establishment of the State, KNESSET, available at
https://www.knesset.gov.il/govt/heb/memshalot.asp (last visited Jan. 15, 2015) (in Hebrew).
40. 39 DK 1609 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yizhar Harari).
41. 39 DK 1615 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yitzhak Klinghoffer).
42. 25 DK 997 (1959) (Isr.) (MK Yizhar Harari).
43. 32 DK 110 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Yizhar Harari).
44. Id.; see also 25 DK 998 (1959) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen).
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the Building and Planning Law, the Criminal Procedure Law, and the
Inheritance Law.45 The proponents of the Continuity Law supported it
in the belief that the government would not abuse its power to apply
continuity.46
D. Constitutional Enterprise
MK Harari explained in 1959 that continuity is also required to
enable the adoption of a formal Constitution in Israel. In his words:
One of the reasons we have not advanced sufficiently in the
Basic Laws, which should comprise the State’s Constitution, is
the fact that, whenever we advance and reach a certain stage, a
new Knesset is elected, and everything that was done is erased,
and it is necessary to begin everything from the first reading.47

Indeed, after the enactment of the Continuity Law, the Knesset
applied continuity to enact, inter alia, Basic Law: The State
Economy,48 Basic Law: The Judiciary,49 Basic Law: The Government
from 2001, and amendments to Basic Law: The President of the
State.50
Did MK Harari contradict himself? On the one hand, he argued
that continuity should only be used for consensual laws. On the other
hand, he supported the application of continuity to Basic Laws. It
appears that these two positions can be reconciled if we interpret his
words to mean that continuity should only be applied to Basic Laws
that are consensual.51 A more cynical view would suggest that MK
45. 39 DK 1603 (1964) (Justice Minister Dov Yosef).
46. See infra Part V.C.
47. 25 DK 998 (1959) (Isr.) (MK Yizhar Harari).
48. The Seventh Knesset held the first reading on Basic Law: The State Economy (66
DK 2176 (1973) (Isr.)), while the Eighth Knesset held the second and third readings (74 DK
3732 (1975) (Isr.)).
49. 99 DK 1734 (1984) (Isr.).
50. The Fourteenth Knesset held the first reading on Basic Law: The Government (DK
1135 (1999) (Isr.)) and the Fifteenth Knesset held the second and third readings (173 DK 2066
(2001) (Isr.)). The Fifteenth Knesset held the first reading on Amendments 6 & 7 (originally
Amendments 7 & 8) to Basic Law: State President, and the Sixteenth Knesset held the second
and third readings. See State Archives G–15640/10.
51. It seems that there was no major division regarding the enactment of Basic Law: The
State Economy and Basic Law: The Judiciary. The Knesset Protocols did not record the
majority by which they passed. In contrast, Basic Law: The Government passed by a majority
of 55 to 32. See Rivka Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review: On
the Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Legislative Override Power, 39 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 457, 469 n.53, 475 n.86 (2012).
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Harari was fully aware of the extent to which the enactment of a
constitution was controversial, since he is credited with the idea of
enacting the Israeli Constitution chapter by chapter through Basic
Laws in order to contend with the difficulty of reaching a consensus
on it.52 According to this approach, at least some of the proponents of
continuity never intended to restrict its use to laws supported by a
consensus.
E. Continuing Body Theory
The proponents of continuity explained that it accords with the
Knesset’s self-perception as a continuing body. They argued that
continuity is already reflected in existing legislation. Thus, for
example, Basic Law: The Knesset states explicitly, “[t]he outgoing
Knesset shall continue to hold office until the convening of the
incoming Knesset.”53 Justice Minister Dov Yosef interpreted this
provision as adopting the doctrine of organs:
The legislator of the Basic Law: the Knesset thus considered that
what is of essence is not the composition of the Knesset, but
rather the parliamentary institution, whoever its actual members
may be. The parliament abides and continues to act—the
participants in the action change.54

MK Prof. Klinghoffer explained that an outgoing Knesset is
authorized to enact laws until the new Knesset takes office.55 He went
even further, arguing that, although it has become entrenched practice
since the establishment of the State to follow the principle of
legislative discontinuity, there is no reason why this practice cannot

52. 5 DK 1743 (1950) (Isr.).
53. Basic Law: The Knesset, Art. 37.
54. Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s statement on first reading: 39 DK 1603 (1964).
55. 39 DK 1616 (1964) (MK Yitzhak Klinghoffer). Similarly, proponents argued that the
Second Knesset (Transition) Law, 1951, also seems to establish continuity between Knesset
assemblies. Article 5 of the Transition to the Second Knesset Law (1951) reads: “The Second
Knesset and its members shall have all of the authorities, rights and responsibilities that the
First Knesset and its members had.” Article 10 reads: “This law will apply mutatis mutandis to
the transition to the Third Knesset and every subsequent Knesset, so long as the Knesset has
passed no other law regarding the matters established in this law.” See also CA 6821/93
United Mizrahi Bank v. Migdal Cooperative Village 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.) (interpreting
this law). In United Mizrahi, while President Barak interpreted the Transition Law to mean
that all authority, including constitutional authority, transfers from Knesset to Knesset, Justice
Cheshin held that the Transition Law means that every Knesset only retains the same
legislative authority. Id.
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be changed, even without an amendment to the law or to the Rules of
Procedure.56
The proponents of continuity also highlighted various examples
showing that the Knesset regards itself as a continuing body. Justice
Minister Pinchas Rosen explained that just as the Knesset considers
itself bound by the Harari Resolution (passed by the First Knesset) to
enact Basic Laws, so too the Knesset is bound by other resolutions
passed in previous Knesset assemblies, including resolutions to
transfer laws after the first reading to the Knesset committees.57 Using
the same logic, Justice Minister Dov Yosef explained that, just as
political resolutions passed by the Knesset are binding, so too are its
resolutions to transfer laws to the committees. “In principle, the fact
that one resolution is a fait accompli and another resolution is in a
matter that is one of a series of additional resolutions is immaterial.”58
MKs Harari and Klinghoffer and Justice Minister Dov Yosef also
drew an analogy from statutes: if statutes remain in effect from one
Knesset to the next, then the same should hold true for bills.59 I note
that another example could have aided the proponents of the law. The
Knesset Rules of Procedure apply automatically from one Knesset to
the next, except if a decision has been made to modify them.60
F. Low Turnover in Legislature61
To justify continuity, the proponents downplayed the difference
between one Knesset and another, on the grounds that the
composition of the Knesset in any case does not change significantly
from one election to the next. Justice Minister Dov Yosef explained
that, although new MKs are not permitted to speak in the first reading
56. 39 DK 1615 (1964) (Isr.).
57. 32 DK 146 (1962) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen).
58. Draft of Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s opening statement to the Knesset, State
Archive GL–21275/12.
59. 39 DK 1608 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yizhar Harari); 39 DK 1616 (MK Yitzhak
Klinghoffer); 39 DK 1633 (Justice Minister Dov Yosef). It was also observed that fiscal orders
approved by previous Knesset assemblies remain in effect and do not need to be approved
anew. Id. (MK Klinghoffer).
60. The law’s opponents referred to the Knesset Rules of Procedure. See 32 DK 107-08
(1962) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader); see also Continuity of the Knesset’s Legislative Activity,
DIRECTIVE OF THE KNESSET LEGAL ADVISOR (2009 ed. [2007]) (on file with author). The
directive states: “Continuity applies to the Regulations and amendments thereof which have
completed the legislative process in the same manner as it applies to statutory legislation
which has completed the legislative process.” Id. at 8; see also infra Part V.E.
61. This argument of the law’s supporters is historically incorrect. See infra Part V.F.
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against the passage of the law as a result of continuity, this is
nevertheless justified, “considering especially that the number of new
MKs is approximately 20 percent of the previous Knesset, that is, 80
percent of the MKs had the opportunity to speak, to debate, etc.”62 It
should be borne in mind that the Continuity Law was enacted in the
Fifth Knesset, in an era in which “a majority of the members of the
First Knesset still remained members of the Fifth Knesset.”63
G. Interim Summary
The proponents of the Continuity Law thus saw in it many
advantages in terms of efficiency, especially given Israel’s special
conditions. They believed that the fact that the Knesset perceives
itself as a continuing body, whose pre- and post-election composition
remains similar, is sufficient to support continuity. The Justice
Ministers also emphasized that the Knesset in any case “is permitted
to continue a debate . . . not obligated to do so.”64 The Knesset may
reject the Government’s proposal to apply continuity. Also, a new
Knesset is not shackled to the deliberations of the old Knesset
because it is able to reject the bill in the second and third readings.65
Moreover, proponents argued that the law actually demonstrates
respect for the Knesset and imparts value to its work, which will not
have been for nothing.66 Therefore, their conclusion was that the
advantages of the law justify its adoption.67
III. THE COMPARATIVE CASE AGAINST CONTINUITY
This Part shows the dominance of comparative law in the Israeli
political actors’ discussions about whether to adopt continuity rule. It
reveals that the proponents of continuity self-consciously used
comparative precedents in a selective way.

62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.

See State Archive GL–21275/12.
32 DK 107 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader).
Id. (Justice Minister Rosen) (emphasis added).
39 DK 1603 (1964) (Justice Minister Dov Yosef).
See handwritten note, State Archive GL–21275/12. Attributed to MK Meridor.
39 DK 1604 (1964) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Dov Yosef).
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A. The Relevance of Comparative Law
1. The Netherlands Experience
Although the sponsors of the Continuity Law recognized that
comparative law for the most part does not support their proposal,
they nevertheless maintained that they were not inventing the wheel,
since some democratic countries have adopted continuity. Thus, for
example, in a Knesset debate on October 23, 1961, Justice Minister
Pinchas Rosen justified continuity, saying:
Although there are not many precedents, and it is true that the
accepted parliamentary practice in most countries is not identical
to the bills we are debating, nevertheless, precedents do exist,
and since this entire debate has become a constitutional
symposium of sorts, it is worth pausing here on the precedents.68

He cited Dutch, French, Belgian, and Indian experiences in
support of his pro-continuity position.69 Similarly, in 1964 Justice
Minister Dov Yosef cited Dutch and French experiences in support of
continuity.70
The Netherlands served the Justice Ministers in the 1960s as the
most clear-cut example of continuity. They described the Dutch
experience as follows: In the Netherlands, until 1917 the principle of
discontinuity prevailed, in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of
the Dutch Parliament.71 Subsequently, the Lower House sought to
adopt continuity but the Upper House objected. After 17 years of
debate, parliament adopted continuity. Underpinning this new
approach was the perception that the composition of its members may
change, but Parliament remains constant. In the words of Justice
Minister Rosen:
And so, we see that the Dutch rule does not hold that upon the
dissolution of parliament, the bills that were before the outgoing
parliament are voided, and no one would argue that Holland is
not a democratic state. Not only those bills, but also the debates

68.
69.
70.
71.

32 DK 145 (1962) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen).
32 DK 145-46 (1962) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen).
39 DK 1603 (1964) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Dov Yosef).
State Archive GL–21275/12.
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are not voided, those debates that were already held in the
sections and in the committees.72

Seemingly, it was about this Dutch precedent that Dr. Yadin
wrote: “This proves once again that there is a precedent for
everything, and it is never right to say that ‘such a thing does not exist
anywhere else.’”73
2. Great Britain as the Symbol of Discontinuity
Whereas the example of the Netherlands supported continuity,
Justice Ministers Rosen and Yosef in the 1960s were forced to
contend with the extremely divergent example of Great Britain. The
opponents of continuity cited the British law as an example of the
absence of continuity even between one parliamentary session and the
next. A matter that has not been completed in one session is void, and
the debate begins anew in the following session.74 They argued
against the Mapai party, which was the ruling party in Israel almost
continuously from 1948 to 1977, saying that the prime minister
“wants us to be like England, except that he wants to choose: what is
convenient for him—we too should have; what is inconvenient for
him—we should not have.”75
Mapai contended with the British example on several levels.
First, it argued that the British government did not need continuity,
whereas the government in Israel does.76 Mapai maintained that no
analogy can be drawn from Great Britain, because there the
government controls a parliamentary majority and has no need for a
coalition.77 The British government also controls Parliament’s time
with regard to duration of the plenary debates, as well as the
proceedings in the committees, which is not the case in Israel.
Therefore, the British government has enough time to pass the laws it

72. 32 DK 145 (1962) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen); see also ERNST VAN
RAALTE, THE PARLIAMENT OF THE KINGDOM OF THE NETHERLANDS 55-56 (1959); State
Archive GL–21275/12.
73. State Archive GL–21275/12.
74. 39 DK 1604 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader). This practice is sometimes called
“Sessional cut-off” in Britain. See THE HANSARD SOCIETY COMMISSION, MAKING THE LAW:
A REPORT ON THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS 330 (1993).
75. 32 DK 107 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader).
76. See Dr. E. Livneh’s correspondence to the Justice Minister Dov Yosef from April 24,
1964 from State Archive GL–-21275/12.
77. 39 DK 1609-10 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Baruch Osania).
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favors.78 It further argued that the British Parliament sits
continuously, day after day, five and sometimes six times a week.79
Furthermore, the British government has at its disposal tools such as
closure,80 the kangaroo,81 and the guillotine,82 which allow it to
terminate debates in parliament and bring matters to a vote, thereby
saving parliamentary time. Justice Minister Dov Yosef even asserted
that he would be willing to do without continuity if such tools would
be adopted in Israel.83
Second, the initiators of the Continuity Law argued that the
British law does not reflect the democratic principle of legislative
discontinuity following elections, since no elections were held
between one session and the next, but nevertheless British bills “die”
at the end of the session.84 Rather, MK Klinghoffer explained, the
British law reflects the King’s prerogative to control Parliament by
ending a parliamentary session (prorogation) and terminating its
legislative work. However, if Parliament itself, and not the King,
makes an adjournment, then there is continuity of debate.85 In Israel
there is no monarchy and there is no reason to maintain the King’s
prerogative to terminate parliamentary debate.
Third, MKs explained that in Great Britain there is no express
law providing for the transfer of powers by succession from one
Parliament to another, such as the Second Knesset (Transition) Law
existing in Israel.86 Whereas the Israeli Knesset regards itself as a
continuing body, the British Parliament perceives itself differently.
Finally, proponents of continuity argued that this is not an
accurate description of the British law, because in Britain it is
possible to deviate from the principle of discontinuity in exceptional
78. 32 DK 146 (1962) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen); 39 DK 1684 (1964) (Isr.)
(Justice Minister Dov Yosef).
79. 32 DK 146 (1962) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen).
80. It may be decided that the debate in Parliament or the subcommittee will be ended,
and the vote will be held without further discussion. See SIR IVOR JENNINGS, PARLIAMENT
127-28, 235-46 (Cambridge University Press, 2d ed. 1957).
81. It may be decided that certain amendments will not be discussed at all in the
Parliament or the subcommittee. Id.
82. Time is allotted at the outset, and the debate is ended when the time runs out whether
or not the discussion was exhausted. Id. at 131.
83. 39 DK 1684 (1964) (Isr.).
84. Draft of Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s opening statement to the Knesset, State
Archive GL–21275/12.
85. 39 DK 1615 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yitzhak Klinghoffer).
86. Id.
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cases.87 Justice Minister Dov Yosef summed up the debate by saying
that, in any event, the British experience was unsuccessful and no
lesson should be drawn from it.88
B. Comparative Law as Reflected in the Archives
The opponents of continuity claimed that it runs contrary to the
experience of the world’s oldest parliaments.89 Furthermore, advisors
to the Justice Ministers warned in internal correspondence, that
comparative law does not support the Continuity Bill. Thus, for
example, in a letter dated October 17, 1961, Dr. Livneh wrote to
Justice Minister Pinchas Rosen, “I did not find [in the comparative
law] a single example of continued handling of laws following new
elections.”90 Similarly, Dr. Livneh prepared for Dov Yosef a review
on comparative law and explicitly wrote on April 26, 1964, that
“much of the material does not side with the bill.”91
However, Justice Ministers Pinchas Rosen and Dov Yosef relied
on Dutch law, French law during the period of the Fourth Republic,
Belgian and Indian law in proposing their bill.92 Did their sources
indeed support the Israeli Continuity Law? The Justice Ministers did
not examine whether these countries are a relevant basis for
comparison to Israeli law in terms of the structure of the regimes and
their legal systems. Also, in observing the material that was available
to the Justice Ministers, the Dutch law was virtually the only source
that supported their stance.93
The State archival material, on which Justice Ministers Pinchas
Rosen and Dov Yosef relied when promoting the Continuity Law,
reveal that not even in France during the period of the Fourth
Republic did the government control the application of continuity.94
87. 39 DK 1683 (1964) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Dov Yosef).
88. Id. (Justice Minister Dov Yosef). For example, the United States started with the
discontinuity principle between sessions, like Britain. Now, there is only discontinuity between
Congresses. Draft of Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s opening statement to the Knesset, State
Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
89. 32 DK 112 (1962) (Isr.).
90. State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
91. Correspondence from Dr. Livneh to the Justice Minister from April 26, 1964. State
Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
92. See 32 DK 145-46 (1962) (Isr.).
93. See supra Part III.A.1.
94. Rather, the initiative to apply continuity was assigned to the parliamentary
committee or the twenty-five members of the National Assembly. If the initiative came from
the committee, then continuity applies by law. If the initiative came from parliament members,
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As for Belgium, only bills approved by one house and passed to the
other house were carried over.95 Apparently, the logic of Belgian law
is that, because of the bicameral system, when a bill is passed from
one house to the other, the act of legislation is considered complete in
the first house. This rationale is not applicable in Israel, where there is
only one legislative house.
As for the Indian law, according to the Israeli archives, the only
exception to the rule of discontinuity occurs when the bill passes the
lower house and the President rules that the bill must be deliberated in
a joint session of the lower and upper houses of parliament. In that
case, then the bill may be discussed even though the lower house was
dissolved.96 The underlying logic seems to be that continuity in the
upper house merges with the continuing body of the joint session,
despite the dissolution of the lower house. This rationale has no
bearing on the case in Israel.
C. The Current Comparative Experience
When we leave the Archives of the Israeli political bodies and
examine the principle of discontinuity with contemporary eyes, we
find that comparative law still adheres by and large to the principle of
discontinuity.
1. Irrelevance of Dutch Law to Israel
There is very little research on continuity, or lack thereof, in
parliaments throughout the world. Interestingly, the research that was
found comes from the Netherlands, which is an exception in the
comparative landscape on the subject of continuity. The legislative
process in the Netherlands calls for both houses of parliament to
consent, but continuity applies with no time limit on the legislative
process. A bill can remain pending indefinitely.97 The discontinuity
this depended on the assembly’s uncontested vote. See 32 DK 145 (1962) (Isr.) (referring to
Article 33 of the Regulations of the Assemblée Nationale from the Fourth Republic in 1949);
see also D. W. S. LIDDERDALE, THE PARLIAMENT OF FRANCE (1951); see also State Archive
GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
95. Relying on translation of “The [Belgium] Law [from 1893] regarding the Effect of
Dispersal of Legislatures on Previously Presented Bills.” 32 DK 145 (1962) (Isr.); see also
State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
96. See AJITA R. MUKHERJEA, PARLIAMENTARY PROCEDURE IN INDIA 45 (1958); INDIA
CONST. art. 107, 108, 196; see also State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
97. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 117.
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principle in the Netherlands was indeed abolished in 1917,98 just as
Israel’s Justice Ministers observed when proposing the Israeli
Continuity Law in the 1960s. Although Van Schagen did not state
this, it is nevertheless important to emphasize that the Dutch lower
house controls its own agenda, and the government cannot dictate
parliament’s timetables and priorities.99 The reality in Israel is
completely different, in that the government has a great deal of
control over the Knesset, and the Continuity Law further enhanced
this control.
2. Prevalence of the Principle of Discontinuity
The Dutch researcher obtained information from the parliaments
of fifteen European Union member countries. The study found that, as
of 1997, the discontinuity principle existed in thirteen out of fifteen
EU member countries. The only exceptions were the Netherlands and
Luxembourg.100 Other research, which studied eighteen Western
European countries, demonstrated that bills also survived elections in
Sweden and Switzerland, unless they were rejected.101 Another
British study reviewing the procedures for enacting laws in thirty-four
countries also found that bills continue indefinitely in Cyprus.102 In
these three studies, it emerges that the discontinuity principle prevails
in the world’s democratic parliaments, whereas continuity is the
exception.
What does the discontinuity principle symbolize in western
democracies around the world? Studies indicate that in most
countries, bills die at the end of a parliament’s lifetime.103 Thus, the
discontinuity principle reflects the democratic notion that elections
sever parliamentary continuity.
The opposite is also true. The problematic nature of continuity is
also evident in the European Parliament. One of the causes of the
democratic deficit of the European Parliament is the fact that it
routinely applies continuity to pending bills, and elections do not have
98. Id. at 118.
99. See Herbert Döring, Time as a Scarce Resource: Government Control of the Agenda,
in PARLIAMENTS AND MAJORITY RULE IN WESTERN EUROPE 223-46 (Herbert Döring ed.,
1995).
100. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 118.
101. Döring, supra note 99, at 242.
102. J. E. Grey, Procedure for Passing Legislation, in CONSTITUTIONAL AND
PARLIAMENTARY INFORMATION 92 (1982).
103. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 118; Grey, supra note 102, at 92.
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real impact on Parliament’s work.104 In fact, German Chancellor
Angela Merkel, in her maiden speech before the European Parliament
as the President of the European Council, in January 2007, proposed
using the principle of discontinuity for Parliament’s work in view of
its democratic importance. In her words: “I am sure that such a
democratic cut-off point would lend the elections to the European
Parliament even greater importance.”105
3. The Change in British Law
The Dutch study found that the most drastic implications of the
discontinuity principle in the comparative landscape existed in
Britain, where bills did not survive from one session to the next
within the same parliament.106 The British have changed the law since
Van Schagen’s study. To improve the quality of legislation and
increase scrutiny of the content of bills, there was an attempt, starting
in 2002, to allow transferring government bills in the House of
Commons from session to session, within one year of the bill’s first
reading. This attempt was made in the wake of recommendations by
the Committee on Modernisation of the House of Commons.107 Given
its success, in 2004 the House of Commons adopted a permanent
standing order allowing it to carry over government bills from one
session to the next, provided that not more than one session and not
more than twelve months have expired since the bill passed a first
reading—although the one-year limit can be overcome by resolution.
British law therefore sets a time limit on the application of
continuity, unlike Israeli law. The outgoing parliamentary session
decides whether to carry over the bill to the next session, but there
must be a separate ninety-minute debate on every bill for which
104. See Laszlo Kovats, Is Discontinuity to Blame? A Quantitative Assessment of
Duration and Timing of European Legislation (unpublished paper, Apr. 2008) (presented at
the ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops in Rennes, France; see also, Laszlo Kovats, Do
Elections Set the Pace? A Quantitative Assessment of the Timing of European Legislation, 16
J. EUR. PUB. POL’Y 239 (2009); Thomas König, Discontinuity: Another Source for the EU’s
Democratic Deficit? (unpublished, 2007), available at http://aei.pitt.edu/7941/. It must be
noted that the European Parliament is one of the two houses of the European legislature, and
its consent to legislation is not always required.
105. Angela Merkel, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Address to the
European Parliament in Strasbourg (Jan. 17, 2007), available at http://www.eu2007.de/en/
News/Speeches_Interviews/January/Rede_Bundeskanzlerin2.html.
106. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 120.
107. See Richard Kelly, Modernisation: Carry-over of Public Bills, SN/PC/03236,
available at http://www.parliament.uk/briefing-papers/SN03236.
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transfer is sought. Thus, British law requires a separate meaningful
discussion of each bill and does not allow the application of
continuity in bundles and in haste, as Israel does. A bill cannot be
changed as part of a process of applying continuity, thereby
restricting the government’s ability to use continuity as leverage for
dictating the content of the bill, unlike the law in Israel.
The Upper House may also apply continuity in an ad hoc
decision, from one session to another, to bills on its docket. It is
agreed that the authority to transfer bills from session to session
should be exercised primarily with respect to complicated bills that
are not controversial. At this point, continuity has not yet been
applied to a proposal that came from one house and was passed on to
the other.108
Even today, bills cannot be carried over from one parliament to
the next in Britain. Elections completely sever parliamentary
continuity in Britain. Based on the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty, Parliament may not shackle successor parliaments to its
decisions. Therefore, despite the flexibility that has been introduced
in British law, this does not support the Israeli Continuity Law.
4. Neutralizing the Principle of Discontinuity
The discontinuity principle is applied in Israel as well, except
that its influence is routinely neutralized by a Knesset resolution to
apply continuity. What is the comparative experience on this issue?
Most countries examined in the Dutch study have no way—or a very
limited way—of neutralizing the implications of the discontinuity
principle.109 In eight out of the thirteen countries examined, the
discontinuity principle could not be neutralized.110
Out of the thirteen countries, only Sweden allows the outgoing
parliament to transfer a law to the next by a specific resolution. This
procedure is unusual in the comparative landscape, as it places the
power of continuity in the hands of a body whose mandate is ending.
Three other countries—Belgium, France, and Ireland—allow the
108. See Carrying over Bills, OFFICE OF THE PARLIAMENTARY COUNSEL (Dec. 18,
2012), available at https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/
file/79351/carry_over_pamphlet_181212_1.pdf. A similar relaxation of the discontinuity
principle between sessions took place in Canadian Law. See Gary Levy, The Theory and
Practice of Prorogation, 4 J. PARLIAMENT. POL. L. 239 (2010).
109. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 121.
110. Id. at 119.
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incoming parliament to apply continuity in defined cases and for
specific bills.111
Four of the five countries that allow neutralizing the
discontinuity principle—Britain, Belgium, France, and Ireland—have
two houses of legislature. The exception is Sweden. Italy and
Germany, which have special procedures for handling legislation
from previous parliaments notwithstanding the discontinuity
principle, are countries with two legislative houses.112 In Austria and
Spain, for example, additional limited time is given for the upper
house to enact a law, so that the discontinuity principle will not lead
to unfeasible results.113
In my opinion, this comparative law reflects the rationale that
there is a need to minimize damages of the discontinuity principle,
especially where there are two houses of parliament. Bicameral
legislative processes are more cumbersome and sometimes more rigid
than in one-house parliaments. Therefore, the comparative law, which
creates exceptions to the discontinuity principle based on
bicameralism, cannot support the creation of exceptions to the
discontinuity principle in Israel.
IV. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE AGAINST CONTINUITY
Not only does comparative law not support continuity, but it is
also not supported by constitutional law. Whereas the proponents of
the Continuity Law cited efficiency in support of their position,
weighty constitutional considerations provide grounds against its
111. In Belgium, the discontinuity principle is established in law. At the opening of a
new parliament, it is customary that the government presents a special law, which contains a
list of bills that parliament will continue to discuss from the previous parliament. This law is
both subsequent to and more specific than the general law, which establishes the discontinuity
principle, and thus it prevails. The effect of the law is not that the Parliament does not restart
the legislative process, but rather that the Council of State does not have to resubmit opinions
regarding the law. Id. at 120. It is estimated that 90% of bills that expire due to the end of
parliamentary life are “resurrected” by special legislation. See id. at 122. In France, if the bill
has already passed its First Reading in both Houses, the discussion continues from the point
where it left off. Only the bill’s initiator may resubmit it. See id. at 120.
112. In Italy there is a special expedited process for resubmitting bills that were
discussed in the previous parliament called Repêchage. The procedure is shortened by
applying stricter time restraints to debates than are applied to regular bills. It is only applied to
uncontroversial bills that would not take too much parliamentary time anyway. In Belgium and
Germany, even if the principle of discontinuity is not overcome, previous sub-committee
reports can be used to save time. See id. at 21-120.
113. See id. at 124.

412

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:387

adoption. I argue that the Continuity Law is incompatible with
representative democracy and should be rejected.
A. Undermining the Mandate Principle
Many MKs opposed continuity, justifiably, on democratic
grounds. They argued that applying continuity diminishes the
meaning of elections. Political parties change their opinions from one
Knesset to the next, and this is reflected in the election campaign.
Sometimes an MK is elected on behalf of one party in one Knesset,
and on behalf of another party in another Knesset. It cannot be taken
for granted that the opinions of the individual MKs necessarily remain
unchanged after elections.114 New factions are created from Knesset
to Knesset. Continuity thus infringes upon the voters’ right to
influence the Knesset’s deliberations.115 Even the Attorney General
clearly stated in 1963 that the bill is a “concession to the principle that
the Knesset can change its composition and trend.”116
The concern that continuity might reduce the effect of elections
has been realized. Thus, for example, in the Fifth Knesset, which
enacted the Continuity Law, a fierce argument erupted over the Land
Bill, on the grounds that certain sections of the law would lead to the
eviction of the Arab population from land subject to it. When the
Sixth Knesset took office, the controversy about the Land Bill and the
radically different composition of the Knesset did not prevent the
application of continuity to the Land Bill. In the opinion of some
MKs, the change in composition mandated a fresh look at the Bill:
We are told that the new government, without the Rafi faction, is
a different government. There was a former deputy minister who
wrote at the time that Arab ownership of any part of the Land of
Israel conflicts with State security. At the present time he is not a
member of the government. The new government includes the
Mapam faction, whose members fought against the expropriation
of land from the Arab Fellaheen, and their position on Wakf
ownership differed from that of the previous government. Why is
the new government attempting to circumvent, by means of this
continuity, any possibility of action by new forces within the
government and within the Knesset? There is also no continuity
114. 57 DK 1972 (1970) (Isr.) (MK Shalom Cohen).
115. 39 DK 1611 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Ya’akov Riftin).
116. Summary of the Ministry of Justice, Legislation Department Leadership Discussion
(Apr. 4, 1963), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
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in factions and in parties. There is Ma’arach, which did not
appear in the previous Knesset. And there is Mapai without the
faction of Knesset Member Ben Gurion.117

Moreover, MKs argued that not even laws that may have been
contested in the elections are excluded from the Continuity Law.118
I argue that the democratic significance of elections should be
the resetting of the Knesset’s agenda. Apart from a referendum, which
has never been held in Israel, elections are the only legal mechanism
through which the people can offer their representatives feedback on
issues that are on the State’s political agenda.119 Thus, it is the MKs’
duty to reconsider their position on bills following elections. This is
the meaning of the principle of representation.
Hanna Pitkin maintains that, for democracy to be considered
representative, genuine elections must be held that have an actual
influence on the actions of the representative bodies.120 Continuity is
not faithful to this feature of representative government. In fact, I
contend below that continuity severs the link between legislative
cycles and election cycles, and thus eviscerates the significance of
elections.121
B. Compromising the Legislative Deliberative Function
In addition to downgrading the significance of elections, the
Continuity Law infringes upon the right of MKs to conduct a proper
debate on bills. In democratic regimes, a parliament member’s right
of debate advances a democratic exchange of ideas and opinions; the
search for truth through the right to hear and be heard; the principle of
persuasion rather than force; compromise achieved through

117. 44 DK 632-633 (1966) (Isr.) (MK Emil Habibi).
118. 32 DK 115 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Hanan Rubin).
119. See Basic Law: Referendum (2014 SH 2443 (Isr.)) (requiring holding a referendum
in certain cases that contemplate transferring territory currently under Israeli sovereignty); see
also Law and Governance Procedure Law (Cancellation of the Application of Law,
Adjudication, and Administration) 1999, SH 1703 (Isr.).
120. HANNA FENUCHEL PITKIN, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 232-34 (1967).
121. See infra Part V.B.
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negotiations among representatives;122 and a culture of justification in
which it is the duty of the government to justify its actions.123
The principle of representation means that the elected
representatives are obligated to account for their actions in parliament
through open debate, which encourages transparency. This is the
foundation of the regime’s legitimacy. “This [right of debate] is a
great right, this is the only right of the MKs, to participate in the
general debate, to influence the MKs, to influence public opinion, to
participate in the committees.”124
The MKs’ rights of debate are constitutional, arising directly
from the democratic character of the State125 and the rights to vote
and be elected.126 They flow from the determination that the Knesset
is Israel’s legislature, its sessions are public, and its decisions are
passed by a majority.127 They are given concrete expression in the
Knesset’s Rules of Procedure, which set out MKs’ rights of debate.128
MKs’ rights of debate are recognized in the Israeli case law. While
the Supreme Court will not compel MKs to hold a proper debate on a
bill, it will protect their right to conduct and participate in a proper
debate, should they wish to do so.129
How does the Continuity Law infringe upon MKs’ rights of
debate? Admittedly, the 1993 law has improved the level of debate
compared to its predecessor from 1964. Nevertheless, the law from
1993 still severely restricts the possibility of conducting debates on
bills, as listed below.
1. Voting Without Debate
The 1993 Continuity Law requires holding a vote on the
application of continuity, but in the absence of an objection the vote
122. See generally ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND THE LIMITS OF REASON (2009).
Vermeule argues that parliament’s character as a deliberative, representative, and
heterogeneous body makes it more suited than the courts to reveal the truth regarding public
issues. Id.
123. On the culture of justification see, Etienne Mureinik, A Bridge to Where?
Introducing the Interim Bill of Rights, 10 S. AFR. J. HUM. RTS. 31, 32 (1994).
124. 32 DK 119 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Shlomo Lorenz).
125. See Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 1992 SH 150, art. 1a (Isr.); Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation, 1994 SH 90 art. 2 (Isr.).
126. See Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958 SH 69 art. 4-6 (Isr.).
127. See Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958 SH 69 art. 1, 25, 27 (Isr.).
128. See, e.g., art. 13, 22, 27, 28, 74-92, 113, 115 of the Knesset Rules of Procedure.
129. HCJ 4885/03 Israeli Poultry Grower Association v. Israeli Government, 59(2) PD
14, 54-55 [2004] (Isr.).
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will be held without a debate.130 In contrast, in a regular first reading,
a bill is debated in the Knesset even in the absence of an objection,
and the bill’s sponsor is allowed ten minutes in which to present it.131
The government may respond, so long as it was not the bill's
sponsor.132 Also, ordinarily, any MK so requesting is allotted three
minutes for speaking in a debate.133
2. Limiting the Deliberation on an Objection
Unlike ordinary debate on a first reading, any faction objecting
to the application of continuity is entitled to have only one
representative to present its position,134 and that representative is
allowed a mere five minutes to do so.135 Following this limited
debate, a vote is held on continuity.136
3. Inferiorizing Continuity Vis-à-Vis First Reading
i. No debate on the content of bills
Not only do the manner and duration of the debate preceding the
vote on continuity deviate from the practice in the first reading of
bills, but also the content of these debates differs. The vote on
whether to apply continuity was meant to be a “substitute” of sorts for
the vote on the bill in the first reading.137 But this is not the case. Over
the years, Israel’s Justice Ministers have made it clear that they are
not prepared to debate the content of bills subject to a continuity vote.
Instead, they are only willing to discuss whether continuity should be
applied to the bill.
Thus, for example, in the words of the Justice Minister Shapira
in a speech delivered by him in the Sixth Knesset:
130. Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993, SH 60, art. 6 (Isr.). MK Hagai Merom,
who initiated the law, put it this way: “not a discussion, but at least a vote.” 128 DK 2989
(1993) (Isr.); see also 128 DK 3055 (1993) (Isr.).
131. Knesset Rules of Procedure Art. 82.
132. Id.
133. Knesset Rules of Procedure Art. 28 (b).
134. Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993, SH 60, art. 5 (Isr.).
135. Knesset Rules of Procedure Art. 97(e).
136. An amendment in 2012 of the Knesset Rules of Procedure reversed the practice and
made the vote about continuity—and not the objection. It thus made it fairer for opposing
factions, who no longer need a majority to overcome continuity. Continuity of Debate on Bills
Law, 1993, SH 60, art. 6 (Isr.); see, e.g., 2000 DK 8563 (Isr.); see also Knesset Rules of
Procedure Art. 97(f) (Isr.).
137. Continuity of Debate on Bills Bill, 1993 HH 49 (Isr.).
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According to the [Continuity] Law, the MKs or factions are
entitled to give notice of their objection. What is the nature of the
objection? Should the objection be to the substance of the law on
which continuity is being imposed? That is to say, a speech
similar to that in the first reading of that law, or a speech that
explains why specifically in this case continuity should or should
not be imposed, and the reasons for this. MK Shofman’s speech
was according to the school of thought, which in my opinion, is
correct—he argued regarding the decision per se to impose
continuity.
I think that MK Avneri’s speech could have served as a speech in
the first reading, had this law been submitted to the House for the
first reading. It is precisely the imposition of continuity that
excludes the possibility of speeches such as that of MK Avneri in
this stage. He was not a Knesset member in the Fifth Knesset,
therefore he did not participate then in the debate, and now there
is continuity on this. With the permission of the Chairman, I will
thus confine my remarks to debating, or answering, MK
Shofman. It is of course impossible for me to hear anew—even
without continuity—the honorable MKs who were not elected to
this Knesset, just as it was impossible to hear Knesset member
Avneri in the Fifth Knesset.138

The MKs internalized the message that the continuity debate
cannot be utilized for a discussion of the bills on the agenda, which
led to the practice of the opposition raising fundamental issues
unrelated to either continuity or the bills but rather pertain to general
political matters.139 This practice became so entrenched that MK
Rivlin cynically observed it is viewed as “a far-reaching innovation,
and perhaps a dangerous precedent, that a Knesset member should
talk to the point [of the bill] when the application of continuity is
being considered.”140 Thus, MKs have two weeks to prepare for a
vote on the application of continuity,141 yet debate on the content of
the bills subject to a vote on continuity has been stifled.

138. 47 DK 215 (1967) (Isr.) (Justice Minister Shapira).
139. 2000 DK 1610 (Isr.) (MK Rueben Rivlin); see also 2000 DK 4592-93 (Isr.) (MK
Rueben Rivlin). The same was true for 2006 DK 2518 (Isr.); 2007 DK 2518 (Isr.); and 2007
DK 4676 (Isr.).
140. 2000 DK 4592-93 (Isr.) (MK Rueben Rivlin).
141. Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993, SH 60 art. 5 (Isr.)
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ii. The resulting damage
Why is the first reading necessary? As Minister Zerach
Warhaftig noted in 1959:
According to our Rules of Procedure, fundamental problems
generally can be raised only in the first reading. The second
reading is a matter for objections to specific sections . . . Because
of a savings of a few hours you want to deny the new Knesset the
elementary right to raise fundamental problems?142

Moreover, parliamentary debate is hindered, as is public debate.
In the words of MK Shlomo Yisrael Ben-Meir from the National
Religious Party:
If there were weighty reasons in the outgoing Knesset that
prevented this law from being put to the vote, then we will put it
to the vote in the new Knesset, without a debate, in the meantime
the whole matter has been forgotten, the opinion of the experts
who spoke about it has been forgotten, public opinion on the
matter has been forgotten. There is public opinion, which also
influences both the Knesset and the Government. And when the
law is ‘fresh,’ it’s something else entirely.143

MK Emile Habibi from the New Communist List expressed
himself similarly, “The first reading of a bill sometimes awakens
wide interest among the public. Legitimate protest activities begin.
This causes entire factions to change their positions. And it happens
that the Government is forced to withdraw a law it submitted to the
Knesset.”144 In fact, even MK Nir-Rafalkes, who conceived of the
idea of continuity, acknowledged that the general debate in the first
reading “influences the street.”145 This open and general debate is
denied by the Continuity Law.146
142. 25 DK 998 (1959) (Isr.) (Minister Zerach Warhaftig).
143. 32 DK 112 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Israel Shlomo Ben-Meir).
144. 44 DK 632 (1966) (Isr.) (MK Emil Habibi).
145. 32 DK 119 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Nir-Rafalkes).
146. One of the reasons for utilizing the continuity rule is for the government to
circumvent the need to present the bill summary anew. Applying continuity makes it
unnecessary for the government to prepare and distribute the bill summary via the sponsoring
minister, to wait several weeks for comments and reservations, and afterwards to present the
summary to the government or the Legislative Council of Ministers for discussion. This is a
preliminary step in the preparation of governmental bills. See Article 59 of the Government
Rules of Procedure. This Article of the Rules of Procedure is based on Procedure for
Preparing a Bill, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DIRECTIVES (Old File) 60.010 (1969). This is,
apparently, another violation of the public debate surrounding bills. However, it is worth
noting that, even if continuity did not apply, bill summaries remain valid despite the
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Moreover, since there is no repeat of the first reading, the
Knesset may apply continuity to bills that amend entrenched statutes
protected under supermajority requirements without fulfilling these
very requirements during the vote on continuity.147 Yet these
requirements for a supermajority in the first reading were intended
precisely to raise public awareness about the implications of a bill on
constitutional rights or on the budget.
4. Bundling of Different Issues
The debate in the Knesset on the question of the application of
continuity is lacking not only in the manner, duration, and content of
the discussion but also in scope. It is characterized by the bundling of
different issues together in such a manner that it is impossible to
isolate a position on a certain bill from the position on continuity per
se or even on the standing of other bills subject to a continuity vote.
i. Continuity and content of bills
Continuity forces the Knesset to conduct a combined debate both
on the substance of bills and on the substance of continuity. This was
aptly expressed by MK Uri Avneri from the Haolam Hazeh-Koach
Hadash party in the Seventh Knesset: “We find ourselves in an
internal conflict on this issue, because we are in favor of the law for
direct elections of mayors, and we are against continuity.”148
In another kind of bundling of issues, an MK who opposes
continuity for reasons other than those cited during the debate on the
objection must nevertheless join the objection and support it because
a vote on the objection amounts to a vote on continuity. There are no
two separate votes.149

replacement of government if no elections were held if the bill was not yet read on the floor of
the previous Knesset. See Continuity of Legislative Acts with the Establishment of a New
Government, ATTORNEY GENERAL’S DIRECTIVES 2.300 (1984).
147. DIRECTIVE OF THE KNESSET LEGAL ADVISOR, supra note 60, at 5-6.
148. 58 DK 2179 (1970) (Isr.) (MK Uri Avneri).
149. See Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993 SH 60, Art. 6(b) (Isr.). However,
whereas the bundling of issues of the former type is unique to continuity, the bundling of
issues of the latter type exists in every vote in the first reading. In every ordinary first reading,
MKs can object to a bill for different reasons, but there is only one vote for or against.
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ii. Omnibus
Bundling issues also stems from the Knesset’s practice of
holding a concentrated debate on continuity of numerous bills. At the
time the Continuity Law was being considered in the early 1960s,
MKs noted that concurrently holding a debate on continuity for
several laws would be a “disgrace.”150 There were even those who
expressed the belief that “this is worthy of Chelm”:151 If a debate is
not conducted separately on each law, this violates the right of debate
of MKs and of the public. On the other hand, if a debate is held on
each law separately, why take an indirect route and not hold a repeat
first reading in the plenum?
In practice, MKs’ request to conduct a debate on each bill
separately was not accepted. The government seeks to apply
continuity to a large number of bills without any thematic connection
between them. Over the years, many MKs from different parties have
repeatedly complained about the pressure to conduct a debate
preceding a continuity vote within a very short time, simultaneously
covering a large number of bills. Thus, for example, MK Uri Avneri
complained in the Sixth Knesset that “the Knesset Committee allotted
to me most generously 10 minutes for discussing 14 laws—45
seconds for each law that determines the fate of people and property
and which was passed in a Knesset to which we did not belong.”152
Similarly, in 2006, MK Dov Chanin from the Hadash party
maintained that this practice of bundling issues in a debate “is
inconsistent with our obligation as a Knesset to conduct a pertinent
debate on each law separately. Wherefore, I will not relate to any of
the 12 laws to which I am supposed to relate in the three and half
minutes left to me.”153
Similarly, on November 4, 2013, under the new Knesset Rules
of Procedure, the Knesset conducted a “combined debate” on the
government’s request to apply continuity to four bills. MK Uri
Maklev from Yahadut Hatorah did not understand this and lost his
right to object to one of the bills. MK Dov Chanin “went out for two
minutes,” and he too lost the right to speak in opposition to another

150.
151.
152.
153.

32 DK 108 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader).
39 DK 1613 (1964) (Isr.).
44 DK 633 (1966) (Isr.) (MK Uri Avneri).
2006 DK 1774 (Isr.) (MK Dov Chanin).

420

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:387

bill.154 Of course, the vote (unlike the debate) on continuity is in
relation to each bill separately.
5. Compromising Deliberations in the Knesset Committees
The Continuity Law not only prevents a repeat first reading of
bills, but also undermines debate in Knesset committees, as discussed
below.
i. A new issue
A Knesset committee to which a bill has been transferred after
the application of continuity may not change the bill
fundamentally,155 because if it did so, this would entitle MKs to
contest it on the grounds that a “new issue” was involved.156 If an
issue was not included in the text of the bill that was submitted for the
first reading—i.e., a “new issue”—no public debate was held on it,
and it therefore must be excluded, according to the Rules of
Procedure.157 It follows that a new Knesset is prevented from holding
a first reading on a continuing bill—because of continuity—and from
changing it fundamentally in the committees—because of “new
issue”. The new Knesset thus loses on both counts in terms of its
ability to influence the contents of a bill to which continuity has been
applied.158
ii. Independent judgment of committee
The present version of the law states that the Knesset “may”
treat the deliberations of the previous Knesset as if they were its own
deliberations.159 Accordingly, the Knesset’s legal department
instructed the Knesset committees to treat any bill as if it had been

154. See Knesset Protocol No. 72 of the 19th Knesset, 147 (Nov. 4, 2013) (Isr.),
available at http://www.knesset.gov.il/plenum/data/19_ptm_260748.doc (translated by
author).
155. 32 DK 114 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Hanan Rubin).
156. See Knesset Rules of Procedure, art. 85 (Isr.).
157. See HCJ 8238/96 Abu Arar v. Minister of Interior 52(4) PD 26, 36 [1998] (Isr.).
158. This problem is relevant only to private members’ bills, which if not for the
continuity rule, would first have passed in the committees. Government bills, on the other
hand, reach first reading without the committee being able to influence their wording. But
government bills are subject to strict public scrutiny via the summaries stage, as detailed in
note 146 and accompanying text.
159. Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993 SH 60, art. 6(b) (Isr.).
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approved “in the first reading and nothing more.”160 This instruction
was intended to allow members of the incoming Knesset to submit
objections to a bill and not have to vote on objections that were
submitted in the previous Knesset. Simultaneously, it was intended to
enable the government to update its estimates on the bill’s budgetary
implications. Nevertheless, the instruction clarifies that “the foregoing
will not prevent the committee in the incoming Knesset that is
preparing the bill for the second and third readings from taking into
account, if it sees fit, the deliberations and examinations that were
conducted in the committee in the outgoing Knesset.”161
How should this instruction be understood? Reference to the
work of committees of previous Knesset assemblies could have been
made in any case, even without the application of continuity. The
practice of the legal advisers and committee managers, who enjoy the
status of civil servants and are not affected by elections, is to preserve
the institutional memory and bring information from the past before
the members of a current committee, even where continuity has not
been applied.
What does continuity add? It would seem that the idea of the
Continuity Law is, inter alia, to save on the committees’ time, as
asserted by the sponsors of the law.162 Hence, the Continuity Law
apparently supports the practice of encouraging the committee
members to embrace understandings reached in a previous Knesset
regarding the articles of a bill. Seemingly, this practice is possible
mainly when the debate on the content of bill was nearly completed in
a previous Knesset, but the latter did not manage to pass the bill in the
second and third readings in the plenum.163 This practice
compromises MKs’ independent judgment.
Even if the opposite occurs and the committee reopens all the
issues, the committee’s members might be preoccupied with dealing
with the previous committee’s activities due to the application of
160. See DIRECTIVE OF THE KNESSET LEGAL ADVISOR, supra note 60, at 5.
161. Id.
162. See supra Part II.A.
163. Thus for example the Combating Criminal Organizations Bill of 2002, was ready
for its second and third Readings, but did not reach them as elections were called
unexpectedly. See 2003 DK 8235 (Isr.). Following the elections, the committee had the same
chair, MK Michael Eitan. Some of the members remained the same as they were in the
previous Knesset. The Chair gave the members the option of starting the discussions anew, but
they opted to adopt the previous committee’s work. See Knesset Protocol No. 29 of the 16th
Knesset (June 9, 2003), available at 82.166.33.81/Tql//mark01/h0023016.html#TQL.
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continuity. They will be busy formulating an opinion on the positions
of the previous committee, instead of approaching the bill as a tabula
rasa according to their own order of priorities and legislative agenda.
This too might compromise MKs’ duty to exercise independent
judgment.
iii. Identity of the committee discussing continuity
The outgoing Knesset generally determines the identity of the
committee of the incoming Knesset that will consider the question of
continuity of bills. According to the instructions of the Knesset’s legal
department:
Towards the end of the Knesset’s term of office, the Knesset
Committee should give priority as much as possible to
considering bills that were approved in the first reading and it
was not determined which committee will prepare them for the
second reading, or that were transferred to it so that it should
decide which of the Knesset committees will be responsible for
their preparation as stated—this, among other things, so that
following the constitution of a new Knesset it will be clear which
committee is competent to request the application of continuity to
those bills.164

Only the government or the assigned committee is authorized to
initiate the application of continuity. It is obvious that the type of the
committee that discusses continuity greatly influences the law’s
content. The ability of the new Knesset to influence the content of
pending bills is also curtailed in this way by the previous Knesset.
6. Is the Curtailment of Debate Inherent to Continuity?
In my opinion, it is possible to reframe the Continuity Law so as
to prevent some of the infringements of MKs’ rights of debate;
however, the violation of these rights cannot be prevented at its core.
A debate could be conducted whenever continuity is applied, even if
no objection was raised. A separate debate could be conducted on
each bill that is subject to continuity, as is done in Great Britain.165
But only holding a complete first reading anew would allow the new
164. See DIRECTIVE OF THE KNESSET LEGAL ADVISOR, supra note 60, at 6.
Theoretically, bills are divided between the committees based on their content. In practice, the
outgoing Knesset Committee has a great deal of influence over the distribution of bills to
specific committees.
165. See supra Part III.
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Knesset to truly debate the bill, to reframe the law, and to raise “new
issues” in the committees. Such issues would no longer be considered
new, because the new Knesset would be able to reformulate the bill
for a first reading. However, in this situation, continuity loses its
meaning. We would have thus returned to the ordinary rules of debate
of the Knesset.
C. Discriminating Against New MPs
If the Continuity Law infringes upon the right of debate of all
MKs, it especially infringes upon the right of debate of new MKs.
Their right to debate during first reading is conditional on the
majority choosing not to apply continuity. Continuity in fact creates
two classes of MKs—those who were present in the previous Knesset
and were permitted to participate in the debate in the first reading, and
new MKs who did not have this right.166 MK Shlomo Lorenz from the
Agudat Israel party expressed himself strongly, saying, “What is this
like? As if it would be proposed that new MKs may not enter the
portals of the Knesset and participate in debates on certain issues.”167
MK Nir-Rafalkes recognized the violation of the right of new MKs
but maintained that participation in the general debate was “no big
deal.”168
Are there differences between new and old MKs that justify this
disparate treatment?169 Such an argument could be stated this way:
New MKs could not have participated in the first reading held during
the previous Knesset, which now bears responsibility for the first
reading. The current Knesset is responsible only for the second and
third readings.
This argument is unpersuasive. The responsibility cannot be split
between two Knesset assemblies. Because the previous Knesset did
not have the final say on the bill, it does not bear responsibility for it.
The new MKs—who are not given equal opportunities to shape the

166. 39 DK 1604-05 (1964) (MK Yohanan Bader); see also 57 DK 1972 (1970) (MK
Shalom Cohen); 32 DK 118 (1962) (MK Shlomo Lorenz).
167. 32 DK 118 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Shlomo Lorenz).
168. 32 DK 115 (1962) (MK Nir-Rafalkes).
169. There are judges who hold that, if there is a relevant distinction, equality is not
infringed at all. Others hold that even if the distinction is relevant, the weight given to it must
be proportional. See e.g. HCJ 4541/94 Alice Miller v. Minister of Defence 49(4) PD 94 [1995]
(Isr.).
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law—still bear equal responsibility with incumbent MKs for its
adoption.
I submit that this violation of the rights of new MKs contravenes
the principle that the Knesset will pass its decisions by a majority of
those participating in the vote. This principle protects each MK’s
equal right to participate in the vote. It is also contrary to the principle
of equal elections, since the Continuity Law prevents new MKs from
exercising their right to be elected to vote on legislation in the
Knesset.170 Equally, it violates the right of voters to choose new MKs,
who in turn have the right to vote on legislation. The Knesset in many
instances over the years has attempted to harm the chances of new
MKs to be elected to preserve the standing of incumbent MKs and
restrict competition against them. Whereas other infringements were
put to the constitutional test and often failed,171 the Continuity Law
has still not been contested in the Israeli Supreme Court.172
D. Violating Minority Rights
When countering the argument that the Continuity Law harms
democratic values, Justice Minister Dov Yosef stated, “This does not
involve any injury either to democracy or to the Knesset, which in
any case does not operate according to the will of all the MKs but
according to the will of a majority of the MKs.”173 He maintained that
when the new government initiates the application of continuity, a
majority of the members of the new Knesset stand behind it.174

170. According to Art. 4 of Basic Law: The Knesset: “The Knesset will be elected by
general, national, direct, equal, secret, and proportional elections in accordance with the
Knesset Elections Law; This article can only be amended by a majority of the members of the
Knesset.” It is noteworthy that in Local Governance Center v. The Knesset, the judges were
divided on the question of whether Article 4 only guaranteed equality between party lists or
also between the candidates themselves. See HCJ 7111/95, 50(3) PD 485 [1996] (Isr.). Even if
we believe that Art. 4 does not protect candidates, it is clear that Art. 6 guarantees equality
between candidates in the right to run for election. See EA 92/03 Mofaz v.16th CEC Chairman
57(3) PD 793 [2003] (Isr.).
171. See, e.g., HCJ 98/69 Bergman v. Minister of Finance 23(1) PD 693 [1969] (Isr.);
see also HCJ 246/81 Agudat Derech Erez v. Broadcast Agency 35(4) PD 1 [1981] (Isr.); HCJ
141/82 MK Amnon Rubinstein v. Knesset Chairman 37(3) PD 141 [1983] (Isr.); HCJ 142/89
LAOR Movement v. Chairman of the 16th Knesset 44(3) PD 529 [1990] (Isr.) (dealing with
the limitation of electoral equality between party lists); Weill, supra note 51.
172. See infra Part V.G. and Conclusion.
173. Draft of Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s address during the First Reading. State
Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
174. 39 DK 1603 (1964) (Isr.) (Minister of Justice Dov Yosef).
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Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s approach expresses a majoritybased understanding of democracy. Continuity actually “hamstrings”
the rights of the minority.175 It affects the minority’s right to defend
its opinions and to try to persuade the majority with new arguments.
“If there is no opposition—there is no Knesset, even if there is a
majority.”176 The entire point of opposition is the minority’s right to
propose amendments that the majority should hear with a willing and
open mind. “Democracy decides by a majority . . . but it must listen to
the opinion of the minority.”177
We must understand that the rights of the minority are an
integral part of the division of power in the Knesset. A part of this
power structure is reflected in Basic Law: The Knesset and in Basic
Law: The Government in issues including the opposition’s power to
unseat a government, which can arise if it fails to pass the Budget
Law or if there is a lack of confidence in it.178 A lack of confidence
can be reflected in fundamental legislative issues. Traditionally, in the
democratic world, if a government failed to pass a major item of
legislation, this was considered as an expression of no confidence.179
Today we require a more explicit expression of no confidence.180
Nonetheless, enabling the minority to express its opinion on
legislative initiatives is one of democracy’s most fundamental
principles.

175. 32 DK 117 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Moshe Sneh).
176. 39 DK 1663 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Moshe Unna).
177. 32 DK 121 (1962) (Isr.) (MK David Bar-Rav-Hay).
178. See Basic Law: The Knesset, 1958 SH 69, Art. 36(a) (Isr.); Basic Law: The
Government, 2001 SH 158, Art. 28 (Isr.).
179. See, e.g., ANDREW HEARD, CANADIAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTIONS: THE
MARRIAGE OF LAW AND POLITICS 68-75 (1991). According to Heard, if the government fails
to pass a key piece of policy in parliament, it should explicitly evaluate whether it still enjoys
parliamentary confidence.
180. Also the Knesset’s internal work arrangements, some of which are regulated in
Knesset Law (1994 SH 140 (Isr.)) and some in the Rules of Procedure, are based on a delicate
balance between the rights of the majority and the minority in the Knesset. The minority’s
rights are framed by basic traditions, such as the division of debate time, the structure of the
Knesset committees, the identity of committee chairmen, the power to initiate legislation, and
the standing of the opposition’s leader.
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E. Constraining the Legislative Discretion181
MKs opposed to continuity also saw it as constraining new
Knessets, which, in the words of Religious Affairs Minister Zerach
Warhaftig, compromised “an important principle such as the absolute
independence of each elected Knesset and its autonomy from its
outgoing counterpart.”182 In one of his letters to the Justice Minister,
he wrote:
According to the theories of the primacy of the people’s
sovereignty on the one hand, and representative government by
elected representatives on the other hand, the elected Knesset
does not have to feel any spark of continuity with the outgoing
Knesset, and it must feel itself free from any legislative initiative
that was begun by the previous Knesset. The Knesset’s
commitment as a body, and also of the MKs as individuals, is
solely towards the electorate which elected the new Knesset and
on whose behalf the members of the new Knesset are acting, and
absolutely not towards the previous MKs whose mandate from
the people ended with the dissolution of the outgoing Knesset.183

In the Seventh Knesset as well, MKs charged that the application
of continuity interferes with the democratic process, since it
contradicts the principle that “a new Knesset may not be constrained
by a previous Knesset.”184
On the face of it, one could argue that continuity involves
“manner and form” restrictions. The Knesset determines for itself
which legislative processes are needed to ensure that the legislative
enactment should be considered a “law.”185 However, a closer study
181. It is customary to speak of the Knesset as sovereign, but the legislature is not really
sovereign in a constitutional system that has a supreme Constitution protected by judicial
review over primary legislation. Diceyan sovereignty requires that no body, not even the
courts, have the power to decide that parliamentary legislation is not law. A. V. DICEY,
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION 39 (8th ed. 1915). Even if
we hold that the Knesset is not sovereign, it is not allowed to bind its consideration and lose its
independence in exercising discretion.
182. Correspondence from Minister of Religious Affairs to Minister of Justice, (Jan. 15,
1964), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
183. Correspondence from Minister of Religious Affairs to Minister of Justice, (July 10,
1963), State Archive GL– 21275/12 (Isr.). Similarly, S. Rozental, who worked in the Minster
of Justice Legislation Department, objected to the Continuity to the Fifth Knesset Bill (1961),
for constitutional reasons—primarily that it bound the new Knesset to its predecessor. S.
Rozental’s comments on proposed summary of Continuity to the Fifth Knesset Bill, (Sept. 13,
1961), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
184. 57 DK 1972 (1970) (Isr.) (MK Shalom Cohen).
185. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 55, at 530-64 (Justice Cheshin).
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shows that continuity is not a constraint on the legislative process, but
a constraint on the results. In fact, the application of continuity
obligates the Knesset to accept the results of a first reading to which it
was not a party. In addition, the application of continuity detracts
from the scope of discretion of the committees of the incoming
Knesset, as discussed above.186
Continuity thus involves a prohibited transfer of the power of
legislation and subjects the Knesset to the results of a process that was
conducted by another body. This is contrary to the rationale
underlying the non-delegation doctrine according to which
“fundamental decisions that are material to the life of the citizens
must be taken by the body that was elected by the people to take these
decisions. The policy of society must be formulated in the legislative
body.”187 The non-delegation doctrine is generally applied in the
relations between the Knesset and the executive branch and prohibits
the Knesset from transferring or even delegating powers from the
Knesset to the executive branch on fundamental issues. This Article
argues that the same principle should be applied to the relations
between a new Knesset and its predecessor, such that the Knesset will
be prohibited to transfer its power in fundamental matters to a
previous Knesset.
Can it be argued that the Knesset is only consulting with the
previous Knesset when applying continuity and adopting the
conclusions of its predecessor as if they were its own? If so, there is
no prohibited transfer of legislative power but instead a wholly
permissible “consultation.”188 The final decision is in the hands of the
current Knesset in two senses: First, the current Knesset is not
obligated to apply continuity. This depends on a positive decision by
it. Second, the Knesset may decide to reject the bill in the second and
third readings.189
My answer is that, although the Knesset retains the power to
decide whether to apply continuity to a specific bill, it does not retain
the full power to frame this bill according to its wishes if it applies
continuity. The manner in which the previous Knesset framed the bill
186. See supra Part IV.B.5.
187. HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defence 52(5) PD 481, 508 [1998] (Isr.).
188. See HCJ 816/98 Aminof v. Altalef 52(2) PD 769, 806-10 [1998] (Isr.) (discussing
the prohibition on binding administrative discretion).
189. These arguments were also raised by the Continuity Bill’s supporters. See supra
Part II.G.
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dictates, to a great extent, the final form the law will take, unless
continuity is not applied. The whole idea of continuity is that the
debate on issues that were already decided is not reopened, so as to
increase the efficiency of the legislative process. The character of the
debate actually conducted on the question of the application of
continuity shows that the Knesset does not debate anew the contents
of the law in question, and it does not exercise independent judgment.
Therefore, its act should not be considered an act of pure consultation,
but the constraint of its discretion.
One may then ask, does a statute that was enacted by previous
Knesset assemblies not constrain the current Knesset to a much
greater extent than continuity does? In fact, the proponents of
continuity in the 1960s argued that, just as a statute binds a current
Knesset, so too does continuity.190 But this overlooks the fact that a
bill differs from a final law in several ways: First, whereas continuity
compels the Knesset to allocate time for dealing with bills which it
did not frame, the Knesset does not have to deal with completed laws.
The latter leaves the domain of the legislative branch and becomes the
responsibility of the executive branch. Completed laws do not affect
the Knesset’s legislative agenda, unless the Knesset at its own
initiative seeks to change such a law, in which case the Knesset
determines what shape this change will take. In contrast, open bills to
which continuity is applied limit the Knesset’s priorities and
legislative agenda, such that the debate to a great extent will continue
from where it left off in the previous Knesset.
Second, where a law was enacted, the previous Knesset decided
on it; it is responsible for it. In contrast, in the case of a bill, whose
enactment into a law was not completed, responsibility for the bill
rests with the Knesset that reaches a decision on the bill. But this
Knesset is responsible for the result without having been able to fully
shape it because of the continuity rule. This is a situation that is
difficult to accept.
F. Strengthening the Government and Weakening the Legislature
Justice Minister Dov Yosef, who was the moving force behind
the enactment of the Continuity Law in 1964, stated that it is the
government that is “responsible” for the enactment of laws, and not

190. See supra Part II.E.
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individual MKs, factions, or Knesset committees.191 I argue that the
Continuity Laws from 1964 and 1993 both express a clear agenda to
strengthen the power of the government to enact laws at the expense
of the Knesset, as argued by its opponents.192 The government had no
need for greater power, however, because the Knesset Rules of
Procedure in any case accord it significant preference in the
enactment of laws over private MKs and Knesset committees. I
submit that changing the balance of power between the government
and the Knesset institutions infringes upon the constitutional principle
that the Knesset is the State’s legislature.
1. A Double Standard in Government-Knesset Relations
Justice Minister Dov Yosef held that an incoming government
should not be subject to the dictates of its predecessor but should be
allowed to choose the cases to which it will apply continuity. For this
reason he also rejected the principle of automatic continuity that had
been proposed by MK Nir-Rafalkes. However, according to Justice
Minister Yosef, the Knesset may not enjoy a similar choice. It did not
bother Dov Yosef—and he openly admitted this—that he was thus
applying two different standards to the Knesset and the
government.193
Religious Affairs Minister Zerach Warhaftig complained to the
Justice Minister about this double standard, “A new government is
not dependent on the previous government, while simultaneously the
new Knesset is doubly dependent, both on the previous Knesset and
on the absolute will of the new government.”194
This double standard is expressed both in the power to initiate
the application of continuity and in the power to oppose its
application. Even under the 1993 Continuity Law, the government
enjoys substantial advantages compared to Knesset institutions in its
ability to utilize continuity, as explained hereinafter.

191. Draft of Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s address during the First Reading, State
Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.); see also 39 DK 1686 (1964) (Isr.).
192. 39 DK 1613 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Moshe Sneh).
193. Draft of Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s address to the Knesset for the First Reading,
State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
194. Correspondence from Minister of Religious Affairs to Minister of Justice, (Jan. 15,
1964), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
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2. The Initiative in Applying Continuity
i. Identity of the initiating body
In the original Continuity Law from 1964, only the government
was authorized to initiate the application of continuity.195 The
government’s position was that, even if the Knesset would want to
apply continuity, the government could withdraw the bill if it wanted
to. Therefore, there was no point in allowing anyone but the
government to initiate the application of continuity.196 Only at the end
of the 1970s did the Knesset amend the Continuity Law to enable the
Knesset committees to initiate continuity.197 Today, under the law
from 1993, the government or a Knesset committee within whose
purview a bill falls may move to apply continuity to nongovernmental bills.198 On the other hand, only the government may
move to initiate continuity to government bills.
The law regarding authority to initiate the application of
continuity weakens the standing of the individual MKs, as well as the
standing of the factions. Neither can initiate the application of
continuity. An MK who initiated a bill cannot initiate the application
of continuity on his own. He can only exercise the veto power against
the continued handling of the bill.199
ii. Private members’ bills
Moreover, even the government itself cannot apply continuity to
private members’ bills that underwent only a preliminary reading, not
a first reading. However, it is precisely these bills that require
continuity. In the words of MK Shalom Cohen from the Haolam
Hazeh-Koach Hadash party:
If continuity is decided upon for the sake of work efficiency, why
should this continuity not also be applied to private members’
bills that were transferred to a committee to prepare them for the
first reading? Here continuity is really essential, because these
are bills that have not passed even the first reading. It is the
practice of the committees to consider government bills first and
to leave the initiatives of MKs at the margins of their work. As a
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1964 SH 2, art. 1 (Isr.).
Handwritten notes, State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
See supra Part I.B.
Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993, SH 60 (Isr.)
See supra Part I.
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result, most private members’ bills are buried. If there is no
difference between one Knesset and the next—as the government
claims, then the same method should be applied to MKs as well.
And speaking of continuity, why should MKs not be allowed to
ask the Knesset to apply continuity to their bills?200

One significant fact revealed in a comparative examination is
that the majority of government bills are enacted into law, and only a
minority lapse because of the principle of discontinuity. For private
members’ bills, the situation is the opposite.201 Thus, for example, in
Great Britain, between 1987 and 1992, 95% of government bills were
enacted into law. In the same period, only 11% of private members’
bills were enacted into law.202 Comparative research thus shows that
if any bills should be excluded from the principle of discontinuity, it
is the private members’ bills that should be excluded, and this is in
fact the case in comparative law.203
In Israel, the law is the reverse: Private members’ bills that only
managed to pass a preliminary reading do not benefit from continuity,
while government bills do benefit from continuity. Do Israel’s
attributes differ in a manner that justifies the difference in the law? In
their study on private legislation, Dana Blander and Eran Klein found
interesting trends in Israeli legislation. On the one hand, between the
First Knesset and the Fifteenth Knesset, the percentage of private
members’ laws increased from 1.96% to 45.05% of all laws. On the
other hand, the percentage of private members’ bills that succeeded in
becoming law decreased in those years from 80% to 1.96%. The
average rate of success of private members’ bills in becoming law is
26.71% versus 85.62% for government bills.204 This data shows that
in Israel as well, private members’ bills could have benefited from
200. 57 DK 1972 (1970) (Isr.) (MK Shalom Cohen).
201. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 121-22.
202. See id.
203. For example, in Italy, Spain, and Portugal, bills proposed by citizens (initiatives) do
not die due to the difficult preconditions for proposing them. See Van Schagen, supra note 1,
at 119.
204. See DANA BLANDER & ERAN KLEIN, PRIVATE MEMBER’S BILLS 42-44 (David
Nachmias ed., 2002); see also Anat Maor, How Did the Dramatic Growth in Private
Legislation in Israel Between the Years 1992-2006 Take Place?, 12 HAMISHPAT 363 (2007)
(indicating that there has been a dramatic rise in the proportion of private bills introduced since
the twelfth Knesset, without providing data regarding the percentage of those bills that succeed
in becoming law). It must be remembered that continuity is not automatic in Israel, such that,
even if it were possible for a private MK to introduce a motion to apply continuity, it would
not lead to the resurrection of all private bills.
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continuity. Nevertheless, this Article does not argue that private
members’ bills that underwent a preliminary reading should be
exempted from preparation for the first reading or from the first
reading itself through the application of continuity. Instead this
Article asserts that, if it is right to recognize the rule of continuity in
Israel, then the rule should also be applied to private members’ bills
that only managed to undergo a preliminary reading, so that they do
not have to undergo a preliminary reading again.
Obviously, someone who opposes private legislation will be of
the opinion that it already accounts for a respectable percentage of all
legislation in Israel, and its success should not be strengthened by
means of continuity. However, it is worth noting that the reason
private members’ bills account for a greater proportion of Israeli
legislation is not because the government is unable to pass laws.205
This is demonstrated by the fact that the government’s success in
passing laws, where it chose to initiate legislation, is incomparably
higher than the success rate of private MKs.
In addition, I note that, in comparative law, the principle of
discontinuity is considered an elegant way of getting rid of
government bills without voting against them.206 Why is it preferable
to get rid of government bills in this way? I believe the explanation
lies in the fact that historically in parliamentary systems, if the
government lost the debate on a bill, certainly a key one, this could
have been regarded as a vote of no confidence in the government that
would lead to early elections.207 The principle of discontinuity makes
it unnecessary to vote on government bills for which there is no
support, and they die without raising issues of confidence in
government. Once again we see that the logic of discontinuity is
supposed to apply to government bills rather than to private bills.208

205. See infra Part V.B.
206. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 123. In Finland this is the main reason that bills
die. See id.
207. See, e.g., HEARD, supra note 179, at 68-75.
208. The government rejected MK Nir-Rafalkes’ recommendation that continuity will be
the default rule because were there to be automatic continuity, “the government would
withdraw unwanted laws, and that would be less aesthetic.” Handwritten notes, State Archive
GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
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3. Objection to the Application of Continuity
The government has enormous power not only in deciding
whether to apply continuity, but also in opposing its application. A
committee seeking to apply continuity must notify the government of
its intention to do so and enable the government’s representatives to
appear before the committee to try to dissuade it from doing so.209 In
order to confer this right of objection on the government, the law
from 1964 was replaced with the law from 1993.210
When a Knesset committee moves to apply continuity, the
government formulates a position on the motion. Coalition discipline
is thus strengthened compared to a situation in which a committee can
move to apply continuity directly in the Knesset without a structured
procedure that requires the government to formulate a position on the
motion. This is because once the government has formulated its
position, under the Transition Law, the members of the government
are subject to coalition discipline. They cannot vote against or abstain
on the issue without the government’s prior consent.211
Moreover, the government uses its power to approve or oppose
continuity in order to control the committees’ work. The government
often makes its agreement to apply continuity conditional on leaving
certain draft wording as it is, without any change in the committee, as
discussed below.212
4. Is the Strengthening of the Government Inherent to Continuity?
This strengthening of the government’s power in the Knesset at
the expense of the Knesset institutions could be somewhat limited by
reframing the Continuity Law. Thus, for example, the factions and the
private members could also be vested with the power to initiate
continuity. Continuity could be applied to private members’ bills that
have undergone a preliminary reading. Private members might even
be allowed to revive government bills. In case of continuity initiated
by a committee, the government could be required to oppose or to
agree to the application of continuity in the plenum alone instead of in
the committee.
209. See Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993 SH 60, art. 4-5 (Isr.).
210. See supra Part I.
211. See Transition Law, 1949 SH 1, Art. 11(g) (Isr.). The Knesset added this provision
as an amendment in 1962; see also AMNON RUBINSTEIN & BARAK MEDINA, THE STATE OF
ISRAEL’S CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 857-63 (6th ed. 2005).
212. See infra Part V.B.

434

FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 38:387

However, even such reframing of the Continuity Law would not
prevent the inherent difficulty of removal of veto-gates. Continuity,
which is easily applied by the government that controls a majority in
the Knesset, removes the restraints of veto and delay that are available
to the MKs only in the plenum or in the committees. These restraints,
in the form of time allocation, agenda setting, power of committee
chairmen, session scheduling, and so forth—could have been utilized
by the MKs to reach a compromise with the government over the
content of the bills.213 Not only are these restraints removed or
weakened without a repeat first reading of the bill, but also the
government may attempt on occasion to leverage continuity in order
to increase its control over the work of the Knesset committees, as
shown below.214
G. Interim Summary
The discussion in this Part showed that continuity is not a
meaningless technicality. Hidden behind its bland façade is a law that
fundamentally reshapes the work of the Knesset, the government’s
relationship with the Knesset, the substance of the rights of debate in
the Knesset, and the significance of basic democratic values. The
Continuity Law detracts from the meaning of representative
democracy. Instead of a debating democracy that takes into
consideration minority rights, it promotes a formalistic, majoritybased democracy. Instead of establishing the Knesset as the central
arena for resolving controversial issues, the center of gravity passes to
the executive government. Instead of treating elections as the voters'
key tool to determine the political agenda, the Knesset is perceived as
an eternally continuing body with elections serving only to shake it up
slightly but unable to substantially affect its actions. Even if the
Knesset were to amend the Continuity Law, it would not be possible
to prevent the core injury to constitutional rights and values. Only a
repeat first reading of bills, with all that this implies regarding the
rights of MKs to reframe bills and put new issues on the agenda,
213. See, e.g., Gary W. Cox, The Organization of Democratic Legislatures, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Barry Weingast & Donald Wittman eds.,
2008); see also Rolf Becker & Thomas Saalfeld, The Life and Times of Bills, in PATTERNS OF
PARLIAMENTARY BEHAVIOR: PASSAGE OF LEGISLATION ACROSS WESTERN EUROPE 57-61
(Herbert Döring & Mark Hallerberg eds., 2004); GEORGE TSEBELIS, VETO PLAYERS: HOW
POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS WORK 103-04 (2002).
214. See infra Part V.B.
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could prevent this injury. But holding a repeat first reading is the
same as emptying the Law of Continuity of meaning.
V. THE NORMATIVE CASE AGAINST CONTINUITY
The previous Part argued that even if we accept the arguments of
the Continuity Law’s proponents regarding its numerous benefits, it is
doubtful whether the law passes constitutional scrutiny. By
undermining the arguments of its proponents, this Part shows that the
Continuity Law does not pass normative scrutiny.
A. Lack of Efficiency
Since efficiency was the most important reason for continuity,
the opponents challenged this in the Knesset. Below, their arguments
are presented and bolstered. First, MKs argued that there are other
ways of achieving efficiency without violating democratic values.
They argued, for instance, that if the government submits bills on
time and not at the last minute, there would be no need for
continuity.215 They also argued that, if the government seeks
efficiency, it can ensure that its representatives discuss an old bill
briefly during the first reading and expedite committee deliberations,
also without a continuity law.216
In my opinion, streamlining legislation in this way is not ideal,
but does less harm than the Continuity Law, since the ones mostly
hurt by it are members of the coalition—not new MKs or the
opposition. Moreover, as an ad hoc arrangement, streamlining can be
negotiated among coalition members. It may serve as the exception,
not used on a regular basis.
Second, opponents argued that the Continuity Law will actually
result in inefficiency, since the law will make it easy for the Knesset
to not complete its work, knowing that the debate can be carried over
to the next Knesset.217 It is clear that it is easier for the outgoing
Knesset to delay legislation if there is a continuity law than in its
absence. Thus, continuity eliminates the guillotine effect of legislative
deadlines.
In comparative law, the discontinuity principle is positively
perceived, since it clears the legislative table from time to time, and
215. 39 DK 1605-06 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader).
216. 39 DK 1664 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Ya’akov Katz).
217. 39 DK 1605-06 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader).
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thus helps to streamline the work.218 Moreover, in the Netherlands,
where continuity is the guiding rule, the Dutch Parliament suffers
from procrastination and a low-quality legislative process.219 The
researcher Van Schagen, whom the Dutch parliament assigned with
the task of examining the effects of continuity, reached inconclusive
results on this question.220 The Dutch experience does raise doubt
about whether efficiency supports the rule of continuity or the
reverse.
Third, MKs argued that continuity will hinder the utilization of
time by the incoming Knesset. MK Prof. Yitzhak Klinghoffer, who
supported the Continuity Law during the term of the Fifth Knesset,
complained of its negative effects during the Sixth Knesset. He
explained that since the process of putting together a new government
is lengthy, this transitional period can be used for resubmitting old
bills to the Knesset and passing them in the first reading, and sending
them to committees. But the government wanted to apply continuity,
and this is something that only a new government, not a caretaker
government, can do under the Continuity Law. Consequently, “this
Knesset was only slightly occupied during the first few months. My
fellow MKs, we then lost a great deal of time that is hard to make
up.”221
218. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 123; see also Grey, supra note 102, at 79, 92,
131; THE HANSARD SOCIETY COMMISSION, supra note 74, at 330 (Prof. Norton’s remarks);
Becker & Saalfeld, supra note 213 at 82; see also Peverill Squire, Membership Turnover and
the Efficient Processing of Legislation, 23 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 23 (1998).
219. There are a number of reasons for the extended legislative time in the Netherlands:
First of all, most non-controversial laws are passed within six months of the time they are first
introduced to the lower house. Conversely, less than half of the controversial laws are
defended in the upper house by the government that introduced them. The long legislative time
therefore applies only to controversial laws. Of course, fiscal bills are passed quickly by both
houses. Secondly, both houses and the sub-committees set their agendas completely
autonomously. Because Ministers cannot be MPs, the government has no official way of
affecting the houses’ schedules. Thirdly, the political culture is such that the ruling parties do
not force the passage of laws without proper discussion, and opposition parties do not try to
extend the discussions unnecessarily. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 115, 117.
220. Van Schagen claims that only in Britain is discontinuity used to hasten the
legislative process. Id. It has been claimed that the discontinuity principle makes for lower
quality legislation. In the Netherlands, it was claimed during the major debates over continuity
at the start of the Twentieth Century both that discontinuity would hasten legislation so that
bills would not be lost at the end of Parliament’s life and that it might also slow legislation
because bills would not be submitted towards the end of parliament’s life. See id. at 124-25.
Because of Van Schagen’s research, the Dutch Parliament decided in 1997 to expedite
legislative processes in other ways. Id.
221. 45 DK 1664 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yitzhak Klinghoffer).
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In my opinion, it is justified to not allow a caretaker government
to apply continuity, as it suffers from both a democratic deficit and an
agency problem.222 The solution is not to empower a caretaker
government to apply continuity, but to strengthen the standing of the
Knesset vis-à-vis the government by revoking the Continuity Law.
Fourth, continuity opponents argued that it is also questionable
whether the law would achieve the goal of shortening the work of the
Knesset committees. S. Rosenthal remarked that, if in actuality the
composition of the committees in both Knesset assemblies remains
the same, the members would remember previous debates and would
not have to repeat them. On the other hand, if the composition is
different, there would be no recourse but to re-debate the new
proposal as well.223 Thus, depending on the circumstances, the law is
either not necessary for shortening the work of the committees or
unjustified.224
Indeed, the Continuity Law was applied in the Sixth Knesset in a
way that did not save committee time. As testified by MK Eliyahu
Meridor from Gahal, “among these 14 laws [to which we sought to
apply continuity], there is only one law, to the best of my knowledge,
which one of the Knesset committees started to discuss. The
committee debate on the rest of the laws never even started.”225
Moreover, the composition of committee members sometimes
changes from one Knesset to the next in a way that makes it
impossible to apply the rule of continuity. Thus, for example,
Chairman of the Knesset Constitution, Law, and Justice Committee,
MK Moshe Unna, testified in the Knesset in the context of the Land
222. See Rivka Weill, Twilight Time: On the Authority of Caretaker Governments, 13 L.
& GOV. 167, 173-82 (2010); Rivka Weill, Constitutional Transitions: The Role of Lameducks
and Caretakers, UTAH L. REV. 1087 (2011).
223. See S. Rozenthal’s Comments on the Continuity to the Fifth Knesset Bill, 1961,
State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
224. In fact, in a draft in the state archive, the Justice Minister acknowledges this reality:
MK Riftin noted that at times a Knesset committee discussing a bill will vote
on an article, and nevertheless agree to come back and discuss the article again
or to hold a re-vote. I do not believe that our bill will prevent this. This is
because we stated that the discussion will continue from the point that it left
off, but in the same manner that the discussion would have been held in the
committee had the Knesset not been dispersed before the discussion was
completed, and so far as the custom is as MK Riftin described, I do not think
that there would be anything to prevent it after the bill is passed.
Draft of Justice Minister Dov Yosef’s opening statement to the Knesset, State Archive
GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
225. 44 DK 627 (1966) (Isr.) (MK Eliyahu Meridor).
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Law that, not only did the Continuity Law not save time of the
committee, but on the contrary, it required the committee to discuss
the reservations of members of the previous Knesset, who were no
longer members of the Knesset deliberating the bill.226 A similar
situation occurred in later Knesset assemblies.227
Fifth, the opponents claimed that not only should legislation not
be expedited by continuity, but the Knesset should also put the brakes
on the legislative process to avoid hasty legislation. To quote
Warhaftig:
It seems to me that the pace of legislation is fast, and sometimes
too fast to the point of being hasty. It is a fact that, according to
statistics, laws are enacted in the Knesset virtually every four
days. If we probe into the matter, we will see that many laws
introduce amendments into laws which were enacted since the
establishment of the State. The numerous amendments proposed
are a sign of certain rashness in our passing of laws, without indepth and basic study.228

Warhaftig believed that since Israel does not have two houses of
parliament and the President does not have a right to veto legislation,
Israel does not need to speed up the legislative process any more, but
instead it needs to do the opposite.229 He was of the opinion that the
Knesset shows disregard for its legislative process, and this leads to
public’s apathy and disinterest in legislative processes.230
Finally, MKs argued that it is unjustified to adopt continuity,
since bills do not pass because the Knesset lacks the desire to enact
them, not because of time constraints.231
Thus, the fact that a bill was not enacted by an outgoing Knesset
shows that it is controversial and problematic, and therefore should be
reconsidered. The opposite is also true to a certain degree: If the
Knesset wishes to pass a law, it usually manages to do so during one
226. 55 DK 3756 (1969) (Isr.) (MK Moshe Unna).
227. Thus, for example, the Tenth Knesset applied the rule of continuity on the National
Health Insurance Law by a majority of forty-three to forty-one. However, because there was a
special committee dedicated to the bill in the previous Knesset, and it no longer existed, the
bill was moved to the Knesset Committee to decide which committee should complete the
work. 92 DK 356 (1982) (Isr.).
228. Correspondence from Minister of Religious Affairs to Minister of Justice, from
(Jan. 15, 1964), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
229. 32 DK 122 (1962) (Isr.) (Minister of Religious Affairs Zerach Warhaftig).
230. Id.
231. 39 DK 1611 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Ya’akov Riftin); id. at 1614 (MK Moshe Sneh); see
also 32 DK 116 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Yisrael Yishayahu-Sharabi).
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Knesset term. Thus, for example, all three legal codes mentioned by
Justice Minister Dov Yosef as grounds for the enactment of the
Continuity Law did not need continuity. The debate on them ended in
the Fifth Knesset.232 The Knesset does not have an inefficiency
problem that needs to be overcome by applying continuity. A lack of
consensus cannot be resolved by taking short cuts. Yet, the Continuity
Law seeks to propose such a short cut.
I should emphasize that, when a bill is passed in a first reading in
one Knesset and last readings in another Knesset, this cannot be
likened to a case where a law is fully enacted in three readings and
twice in two Knesset assemblies. Legislation of the latter kind is
characteristic of constitutional amendments. This latter process may
indicate the existence of a stable, consistent and long-term majority
for constitutional change.233 In contrast, legislation of the first type is
characteristic of a situation where there is no consistent, long-term
majority in even one Knesset assembly, a fortiori in two, which can
garner support for the enactment of even an ordinary law.234
B. Manipulative Use
The proponents of continuity claimed that it was justified as a
way to minimize the damages of governmental instability. Although
continuity will not prevent instability, it will at least create continuity
in the actions of governments, despite the turnover of power. In my
opinion, precisely because of the frequency and lengthy duration of
caretaker governments in Israel, one should avoid continuity, as it
intensifies the inherent ills of caretaker governments—which are the
agency problem and democratic deficit.235 While caretaker
governments cannot apply continuity, they can submit a bill for a first
reading at the end of the term of an outgoing Knesset, as discussed
below. Moreover, the instability of governments raises serious
concerns that continuity will be used to artificially obtain a majority
for the enactment of laws.
One of the most acute problems of continuity is that it gives the
government many tools to obtain a plurality for passing laws, which
232. Planning and Building Law, 1965 SH 307 (Isr.); Criminal Procedure Law, 1965 SH
161 (Isr.); Inheritance Law, 1965 SH 63 (Isr.).
233. Rivka Weill, Shouldn’t We Seek the People’s Consent? On the Nexus between the
Procedures of Adoption and Amendment of Israel’s Constitution, 10 LAW & GOV. 449 (2007).
234. See infra Part V.B (discussing attaining an artificial majority).
235. Weill, Twilight Time, supra note 222.
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perhaps could not have been passed if it weren’t for the application of
continuity. This turns continuity from a tool designed to streamline
the Knesset’s work into a tool that allows manipulation in enacting
laws, without anyone being clearly accountable and without all MKs
or the public being fully aware of the tactics employed to secure a
majority for the law. We have already talked about the tactic of
bundling together many issues for a joint debate.236 Below I describe
other techniques used.
1. Submission of Bills by an Outgoing Knesset
Sometimes the government takes advantage of the last weeks of
the term of an outgoing Knesset to submit many bills.237 For example,
the Knesset enacted the Dissolution of the Eighteenth Knesset Law on
October 15, 2012.238 This fact did not prevent the government from
publishing thirteen new bills a day before the dissolution—including
the Knesset Dissolution bill. Even after dissolution and before
elections were held, the government issued another nine bills.239
The government submitted many of these bills when it was clear
that they would only pass a first reading in the outgoing Knesset
because there wasn’t a majority to support them in the second and
third readings or because there was insufficient time to prepare them
for these readings. The government tabled these bills in the hope of
applying continuity to them in the next Knesset.
But, this is a flawed mode of conduct. After all, MKs assumed
these proposals would only pass a first reading in the outgoing
Knesset due to the approaching election date. Many MKs were thus
absent from the debate in the first reading, instead focusing on their
election campaigns.240 Application of continuity denies these bills a
236. See supra Part IV.B.
237. 39 DK1662 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Moshe Unna).
238. The Dissolution of the 18th Knesset Law, 2012 SH 2383 (Isr.).
239. See MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, http://www.justice.gov.il/MOJHeb/Reshumot/Hok/2013
(last visited Jan. 15, 2015).
240. Can we assume that MKs are aware of the Continuity Law and take it into
consideration when they are absent from First Readings in an outgoing Knesset? In my
opinion, in a world of limited resources, MKs prefer short-term over long-term considerations.
So far as they are concerned, the important issue is the reelection campaign. The bill is
perceived as an issue that can be put off. Its fate is dependent on unknown contingencies, such
as the makeup of the Knesset and the government after the elections. Further, they may assume
that maybe the bill was presented merely as a means to make a stand and generate publicity on
the eve of the elections, and there is no intention of continuing with the legislation following
the elections.
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first reading also in the incoming Knesset. It therefore emerges that
these bills are not ever given a meaningful first reading. Submitting
bills in this way denotes a desire to “steal” the first reading and wait
for a plurality in the coming Knesset assembly.
Another problem is that, at this point, the Knesset is already an
outgoing Knesset. It has lost public legitimacy. Considerations of an
outgoing Knesset are likely to be driven by election concerns.241 Even
if these bills had passed all stages of legislation in the outgoing
Knesset, it is questionable whether this is the way to enact laws.
Wholesale submission of bills during an election period shows
that continuity has eroded the significance of elections. In democratic
countries, it is customary to see correlation between legislation cycles
and election cycles, wherein a government submits many bills at the
beginning of its term of office and a few at the end. Democratic
governments do not usually submit numerous bills at the end of the
term of office, as they will be “penalized” for this in the elections.
These are bills that do not have much of a chance to complete the
legislative process before elections and, without the application of
continuity, die at the end of the parliamentary term. Submitting them
undermines the goodwill of government in the eyes of the voting
public.242 Yet, in Israel, continuity has created a situation where the
government has no qualms about submitting numerous bills at the end
of its term. The connection between the elections cycle and the
legislation cycle has been harmed by continuity.
Individual MKs are also trying their hand during an election
period to enact laws or at least to pass them in a first reading, thinking
that the coalition discipline had slackened.243 Thus, both the
government and the opposition are taking advantage of continuity in a
way that undermines the significance of elections. In fact, the
241. On the special position of outgoing legislatures, see Weill, Constitutional
Transitions, supra note 222; BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE FAILURE OF THE FOUNDING FATHERS:
JEFFERSON, MARSHALL, AND THE RISE OF PRESIDENTIAL DEMOCRACY (2005); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, THE CASE AGAINST LAMEDUCK IMPEACHMENT (1999); cf. Edward J. Larson,
The Constitutionality of Lame-Duck Lawmaking: The Text, History, Intent, and Original
Meaning of the Twentieth Amendment, 2012 UTAH L. REV. 707 (2012).
242. See Kovats, Do Elections Set the Pace?, supra note 104, at 239-41 (providing a
great deal of literature which supports the existence of cycles of legislation which are synced
up with cycles of elections throughout the democratic world).
243. Thus private MKs presented twenty private bills on October 15, 2012, parallel to
government bills presented on the same day. See Knesset Protocol No. 381 of the Eighteenth
Knesset, KNESSET (Oct. 15, 2012), http://www.knesset.gov.il/plenum/heb/plenum_search.
aspx.
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government sought to amend the Continuity Law in the 1990s in
order to bolster its right to oppose initiatives of Knesset committees to
apply continuity. The rationale was “that before Knesset elections,
MKs often submit bills to the Knesset, and in many cases the
Government does not have the time to examine them thoroughly.”244
2. Revival of “Old” Bills
The mirror image of applying continuity to old bills is also very
problematic. Continuity may only be applied to bills that have passed
a first reading in the outgoing Knesset.245 But there is no limit on the
amount of time that has passed since the date on which the bill was
originally submitted and read the first time and the date on which
continuity is applied. There is also no requirement that continuity be
applied within a limited time frame from the time a new government
takes office. Therefore, theoretically a span of about eight years could
pass from the time the bill passed a first reading and the time
continuity is applied to it. This could occur if a bill passed a first
reading at the beginning of the outgoing Knesset and continuity was
applied towards the end of the term of the incoming Knesset.
Applying continuity in such circumstances creates a situation
where there is no aggregate concurrent consent for the law.246 It is
doubtful whether the majority of the first reading may be joined to the
majority of the second and third readings, and, on that basis, claim
that the law has enjoyed steady and continuous support of MKs. The
passage of time may indicate that the opposite is true.
3. Flexibility in Applying Continuity
The Continuity Law does not set a limit on the number of times
the government can apply continuity in one term. Israel’s
244. See State Archive G–9055/16 (Isr.).
245. Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993 SH 60, art. 1 (Isr.). This is the position of
the Attorney General and the legal advisor of the Knesset in their interpretation of the law. See
Continuity of Legislative Acts with the Establishment of a New Government, ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S DIRECTIVES 2.300, supra note 146; DIRECTIVE OF THE KNESSET LEGAL ADVISOR,
supra note 60, at 3.
246. Thus, for example, it is unclear whether there was a concurrent majority for the
Twenty-Seventh Amendment of the US Constitution. Some states ratified this amendment with
a gap of almost a hundred years between them. It is difficult to combine the agreement of the
various states and argue that their agreement amounts to a concurrent majority required for
constitutional amendment. See Sanford Levinson, Authorizing Constitutional Text: On the
Purported Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 11 CONST. COMM. 102 (1994).
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governments thus apply continuity multiple times throughout the term
of the new Knesset.247 The great flexibility granted to the government
gives it a powerful tool to maximize its control of the Knesset. The
government is not required to disclose in advance its full legislative
agenda, but it may adopt a piecemeal method. It has an enormous
framing power to determine whether to apply continuity to a single
bill, a small group of bills, or a large group of bills.
4. Leveraging Continuity
Under the 1993 Continuity Law, the Knesset committees must
notify the government twenty-one days in advance of their intention
to apply continuity. The government may take advantage of this
advance notice to influence the content of the law. Sometimes the
government agrees to continuity, provided that the wording of the bill
is changed.248 This is quite baffling; if the wording of the bill changes,
how can it be said that continuity has been applied? Sometimes the
government stipulates its consent on there being no change in the
wording of the bill before it is presented for a second and third
readings.249 In such cases, not only does the Continuity Law prevent a
repeat first reading of a bill, but the government also gives its consent
to continuity with a condition forbidding discussion of the bill by a
committee or in second and third readings. Sometimes the
government makes its consent to continuity contingent on not
promoting the bill for which its consent was granted, so that a
competing government bill drafted on the same subject may
succeed.250 Sometimes the government makes its consent to
247. See 44 DK 474 (1966) (Isr.); 44 DK 553 (1966) (Isr.); 44 DK 737 (1966) (Isr.)
(exhibiting the Government’s multiple notifications on different dates of its intent to apply
continuity to various bills already in the Sixth Knesset).
248. Thus, for example, the National Insurance Bill (Amendment 7) of 2002 passed the
first reading in the outgoing Knesset. Agreement to apply continuity in the incoming Knesset
was contingent upon rephrasing the bill in a way that would significantly limit the budgetary
ramifications. See State Archive G–15640/11 (Isr.).
249. Thus, for example, the government agreed to apply continuity to the 1996 Local
Municipalities Bill (Legal Advice) (Amendment No. 3) on the condition: “that the bill’s
wording as it was submitted by the Justice Ministry and discussed by the Committee for
Internal and Environmental Issues will be the version that will be submitted for the Second and
Third Reading in the Knesset.” Id. A similar decision was made regarding the government’s
agreement to apply continuity to the 1995 Local Municipalities Bill (Legal Advice)
(Amendment No. 2). State Archive G–13098/2 (Isr.).
250. Thus, the government agreed to apply continuity to the 1996 Prohibition of Driving
on the Beach Bill on the condition: “that the version of the bill which will be promoted in the
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continuity contingent on delaying deliberations of the bill by a
committee, thereby enabling the government to formulate new
courses of action, such as setting up a public committee to study the
matter.251 Alternatively, the government may ask the committee to
delay deliberations, so as not to force it to oppose continuity.252
All this is done behind the scenes, without all the MKs being
fully aware of all these courses of action.253 The government could
not have conducted itself in this way had the bill been submitted again
for a first reading; the government would then have been forced to
state its position clearly to all MKs and the public. It is not only the
government but also interested parties who act behind the scenes to
thwart or promote the application of continuity, without the public
being aware of it and without being accountable for these actions.254
These government tactics are arguably not unique to continuity.
Rather the government can apply these tactics to all private bills that
have to pass a preliminary reading. These bills are referred to a
Knesset committee to prepare them for a first reading. The
government may make its approval of these bills conditional. The
problem with this comparison is that, in applying continuity, it is
assumed that no normative change in the status of the bill has
occurred—when in fact consent conditioned on meeting the new
government’s demands amounts to discontinuity. At the very least,
the Knesset plenum must be made aware of these conditions.

discussions of the Committee for Internal and Environmental Issues is that which the
government presented in its proposal to the Knesset.” State Archive G–13908/1 (Isr.).
251. Thus, the government resisted applying continuity to 1996 Freedom of Information
Bill, unless the discussion of the bill was delayed until the government submitted its own bill
on the issue and both could be discussed together. Id. A similar tactic was employed regarding
1996 Criminal Code Bill (Amendment No. 57) (Punishments for Sex Crimes). Id.
252. Thus, for example, the government requested that the Education and Culture
Committee delay the discussion regarding continuity for The 2002 Rights of Children with
Learning Disabilities in the Regular Education System Bill, under the claim that they had not
yet found a source of funding for it. See State Archive G–15640/10 (Isr.).
253. The decisions are generally made by the Ministers Committee for Legislation,
which meets behind closed doors and does not publicize its full transcripts.
254. Thus, for example, the Coordinating Bureau of Economic Organizations sent a
letter on October 13, 1996, to resist applying continuity to 1995 Minimum Wage Bill
(Amendment 2), which led the government to act accordingly. See State Archives G-13098/1
(Isr.).
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5. Legislation by Reference
Legislation by reference is another problem associated with
continuity.255 When the government or the committee requests the
application of continuity, it also submits a list of bills to which
continuity should be applied. Any Knesset member wishing to know
the content of the bills or to peruse the related debates from the
previous Knesset’s sittings must take that burden on himself. The
Knesset debate is thus also impaired, creating a serious problem of
transparency and even accountability for these bills.
6. Is Strategic Use Inherent to Continuity?
The government leverages continuity to obtain an artificial
majority for laws. Could the Continuity Law be redrafted in a way
that would prevent its abuse by the government? The law could have
prohibited the application of continuity to bills presented for a first
reading after the Knesset becomes an outgoing body. The law could
have confined continuity to a limited period after a new government
takes office. The government could have been prohibited from
leveraging its consent in order to silence debate on the contents of the
law. Whenever continuity could have been applied, the law could
have required that all material be presented to MKs prior to the
continuity debate. All these requirements would have substantially
bolstered the Knesset’s standing. But they could not have addressed
the inevitable consequence that the government’s standing was
strengthened by the removal or weakening of barriers of veto and
delay.
C. Enactment of Controversial Laws
The proponents of continuity in the 1960s recognized that
continuity should not be applied to controversial laws. Also, in
comparative law it is customary to limit the implications of the
discontinuity principle only with respect to consensual laws.256 In
effect, continuity is applied differently in Israel and is inconsistent
with the proponents’ original undertaking.
Two salient examples from the years shortly following the
adoption of the Continuity Law are the Land Law and sections of the
255. On the serious problems of legislation by reference, see also Weill supra, note 51.
256. See supra note 112 and accompanying text (explaining the Italian Rule).
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Population Registration Law. Both pieces of legislation were highly
controversial at the time, but nevertheless were enacted by applying
continuity. We have already discussed the Land Law.257 As for the
Population Registration Law, MKs argued in the Sixth Knesset that:
Had a university lecturer discussed the Continuity Law, he would
have presented the case of the Government resolution on the
Population Registration Law as a classic example when not to
employ the Continuity Law . . . . When the Population
Registration Law was put forward in the Knesset, there was
opposition nearly across the board to three of its 51 sections . . . .
The opposition was so strong that the Knesset Constitution, Law
and Justice Committee could not reach consensus on these three
sections and motioned for the Knesset to allow the Constitution,
Law and Justice Committee to submit the Population Registration
Law without these three controversial sections. Now the
Government is asking us to agree to continuity with respect to
these three sections.258

A recent example is the use of continuity to enact the Biometric
Database Law even though the law is at the center of extreme public
controversy.259
The problem with the application of continuity to controversial
laws is that it creates a sense of underhanded opportunism among
MKs opposing the law. Controversial laws call for greater
clarification and deliberation, giving MKs the opportunity to persuade
and be persuaded. One should not establish facts on the ground, as is
done by using continuity.
The application of continuity to controversial laws not only
undermines the intention of the Continuity Law’s proponents, but it
realizes the concerns of the law’s opponents.260 There would not have
been opponents to continuity—or at least there would have been

257. See supra Part IV.A.
258. 47 DK 213-14 (1967) (Isr.). For the debates in the third reading, see 49 DK 2960-67
(1967) (Isr.).
259. Inclusion of Biometric Methods of Identification and Biometric Identification Data
in Identification Papers and Databases Law, 2009 SH 418 (Isr.) (passing the first reading on
October 29, 2008, continuity was applied on May 6, 2009); see also KNESSET,
http://www.knesset.gov.il/committees/heb/docs/mada_18.pdf (last visited Jan. 15, 2015);
Nitzan Lebovic & Avner Pinchuk, The State of Israel and the Biometric Database Law:
Political Centrism and the Post-Democratic State, THE ISRAELI DEMOCRACY INSTITUTE (June
10, 2010).
260. See 47 DK 213 (1967) (Isr.) (MK Yoseph Shufman).
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fewer opponents—had continuity been assiduously confined to
technical laws, such as legal codes.261
This difficulty could have been overcome by redrafting the
Continuity Law, so that the application of continuity would have been
made contingent on the consent of a special majority of MKs. This
would have guaranteed that the principle would only be applied to
laws for which there is broad consensus.262
D. Enactment of Basic Laws
MK Harari supported the Continuity Law to make it easier to
enact a Constitution. However, the fact that the Continuity Law
makes legislation possible by artificially obtaining a majority in an
opportunistic way demonstrates that the Continuity Law should not be
a vehicle for the enactment of Israel’s Basic Laws. That some Basic
Laws were enacted under continuity testifies to the flawed manner in
which they were enacted.
E. Scrutiny of the Continuing Body Theory
While the proponents of the Continuity Law claimed that the
Knesset sees itself as a continuing body, the opponents maintained
that each parliament is born anew.263 The fact that MKs do not have a
permanent status and seniority rights shows that the Knesset does not
perceive itself as a continuing body.264 Moreover, there is no
continuity on agenda proposals, interrogatories, committee
summaries, actions of the Finance Committee concerning a discussion
of bills, and recommendations relating to the State Comptroller’s
Report.265 MKs argued that, although the Knesset’s Rules of
Procedure automatically apply unless the Knesset decides to amend

261. In Germany, for example, the solution to the discontinuity principle is breaking up
complex legislation into several individual bills so that they can be presented in several
consecutive parliaments. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 122.
262. It should be mentioned that when a law or a Basic Law requires a special majority
for the Knesset to make a decision, it is not an entrenchment. The Knesset may overcome this
requirement by turning to a path of amendment (of the law which includes this demand) by
regular majorities, but will “pay” a political price for it. See HCJ 07/1169 Dr. Reves v. The
Knesset (Feb. 6, 2007), Nevo Legal Database (by subscription) (Isr.).
263. Correspondence from the Minister of Religious Affairs to the Justice Minister from
July 10, 1963, State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
264. 39 DK 1604 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader).
265. 39 DK 1611 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Ya’akov Riftin); id. at 1667 (MK Yoseph Kushnir).
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them, “the Rules of Procedure do not impose obligations on
citizens.”266
In fact, the core of the disagreement between proponents and
opponents of the Continuity Law centered on the nature of the
Knesset. Continuity supporters sought to ascribe to the Knesset
perpetuity and continuity similar to an artificial body, like a
corporation. Their arguments were unintentionally based on an ageold philosophical-religious tradition, which sought to attribute to a
king as sovereign in the kingdom both the mortal natural body and the
eternal artificial body. Upon the death of the natural body,
sovereignty is passed to the new natural body of the heir, but
continuity is maintained because the artificial body is immortal. These
notions were later implemented in parliament, in its role as the new
embodiment of sovereignty. Accordingly, the composition of
individual members changes, but the continuity of parliament is
preserved. Therefore, elections should not affect the work of
legislation.267
The opposite notion is that the entire essence of democracy,
unlike a monocracy or theocracy, is that sovereignty is in the hands of
the constituents. The continuity of sovereignty rests with the people,
not with their representatives. In day-to-day matters, the People’s
sovereignty is manifested in the real power of constituents to
influence the content of laws by breaking the legislative continuity
and electing new representatives.
In my opinion, not only does the view of the Knesset as a
continuing body contradict the principle of democracy and the
essence of elections, as discussed above, but the Knesset did not and
does not regard itself as a continuing body. The Knesset’s view of
itself has a concrete effect on the rule of recognition of the system.268
Until the Continuity Law, the Knesset conducted itself from one
parliament term to the next according to the discontinuity principle. A
law had to be passed to change this practice. Even after enacting the
law, the default is discontinuity, unless the Knesset decides otherwise.
Additionally, the 1993 Continuity Law prohibits the application
of continuity to private bills for which the initiator is not presently an
MK or did not agree to the application of continuity.269 The sponsor
266.
267.
268.
269.

32 DK 108 (1962) (Isr.) (MK Yohanan Bader).
See, e.g., KANTOROWICZ, supra note 8.
H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 100-23, (2d ed. 1994).
Continuity of Debate on Bills Law, 1993 SH 60, art. 3 (Isr.).
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of the law offered the following reasons for this position: One, to
prevent a piggyback phenomenon, in which the initiator of a bill no
longer supports it but others exploit the fact that it was submitted.270
Two, if the MK who initiated the bill is presently a cabinet member
but continuity lacks government’s consent, this would violate the
shared responsibility principle.271 Three, it deals with bills proposed
from a certain “position”; perhaps the initiator submitted a bill when
he was a cabinet member and now he is in the opposition or vice
versa.272
The present law holds the stick at both ends. On the one hand, it
allows the Knesset to pass a resolution to apply continuity, even
though MKs who were present at the first reading and sat on the
Knesset committees are not members of the current Knesset. On the
other hand, it makes the application of continuity dependent on the
position of an individual MK who initiated the law. According to the
latter approach, the Knesset should not be regarded as a continuing
body, but rather is dependent on the specific composition of its
members, and each Knesset is different from its predecessor.
The US Senate is considered a continuing body, in the sense that
its Rules of Procedure continue to apply, unless modified by a
supermajority according to prescribed rules. But the Senate’s
continuity rests in the regulated turnover of its members; only onethird are up for reelection every two years, and the rest continue to
hold office.273 In Israel, as all members of the Knesset are up for
reelection in all elections, it is pointless to discuss continuity in terms
of the US Senate.274 Furthermore, even in the US Senate, the principle
of discontinuity of the legislative process applies, as bills that do not
become law within two years are dead.275
270. 128 DK 2989 (1993) (Isr.).
271. Continuity of Debate on Bills Bill 1993 HH 49 (Isr.).
272. 128 DK 2989 (1993) (Isr.) (MK Hagai Merom).
273. On the fierce debate regarding the continuity of the US Senate, see Aaron-Andrew
P. Bruhl, Burying the ‘Continuing Body’ Theory of the Senate, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1401 (20092010). The biggest difficulty in changing the Senate Standing Rules is the filibuster, which
provides the minority the power to control the majority’s work, and there is no way to override
the filibuster without the supermajority required to change the Standing Rules.
274. The Knesset Rules of Procedure, while they continue to apply from Knesset to
Knesset, can be changed by a regular majority and are therefore dissimilar to the Senate Rules.
It is interesting to note that the Knesset Rules of Procedure have no provision determining
their continuity. Rather, this is the interpretation of the Knesset Legal Advisor. See DIRECTIVE
OF THE KNESSET LEGAL ADVISOR, supra note 60.
275. See Bruhl, supra note 273, at 1445, 1447-48.
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F. Turnover of MKs
Justice Ministers Rosen and Yosef justified continuity, inter alia,
with the rationale that the composition of the Knesset hardly changes
from one round of elections to another. However, the assumption that
the composition of the Knesset does not change was not true then, nor
is it true today. Actually, the only time parliament’s changed
composition was negligible occurred during the Fifth Knesset, which
enacted the Continuity Law, when only nine new MKs were elected
out of 120. Between 1951 and 1996—except for the Fifth Knesset—
the Israeli Democracy Institute found that the number of new MKs
ranged between thirty-one and fifty MKs.276 An average of onequarter of the house members changed from one election to another
during those years.
According to these figures, one may wonder whether the
proponents of the Continuity Law were aware of the anomaly of the
Fifth Knesset, passing the Continuity Law at the time of the lowest
turnover of MKs. This concern is magnified in light of the
proponents’ knowledge of the instability of Israeli governments. It
seems they took advantage of the opportunity to pass the Continuity
Law. Even if it weren’t for the fact that Israel has a traditionally high
turnover of parliament members, a small change in the composition of
the Knesset can also change the political balance.277 Therefore, the
claim that supposedly the small turnover in the Knesset composition
justifies continuity does not stand the test of scrutiny.
G. Interim Summary
The previous Part raised arguments against the Continuity Law
stemming from constitutional considerations. This Part sought to
show that the considerations that led proponents to support it do not
stand the test of scrutiny. In fact, the proponents’ justifications for
enacting it should have supported its rejection. Considerations of
efficiency, frequency of caretaker governments, and Knesset turnover
may serve as arguments against continuity.
In view of the Continuity Law’s dramatic infringements of rights
and constitutional values, and its far-reaching effect of weakening the
Knesset and strengthening the government in the legislative
276. See MK Overturn, http://www.idi.org.il/media/767479/parliament_12_1996.pdf
(last visited Jan. 1, 2015).
277. 32 DK 123 (1962) (Isr.) (Minister Zerach Warhaftig)
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enterprise, I posit that it should be repealed. The Law as presently
worded does not pass constitutional scrutiny.278
The Continuity Law minimizes the significance of elections and
infringes upon MKs’ rights of deliberation and their rights to enjoy
equal voting power in the Knesset. In the same vein, the law severely
infringes upon the right of voters to elect MKs who have an equal
right to vote in the Knesset. These constitutional rights to vote and be
elected are protected in Sections Four to Six of the Basic Law: The
Knesset.279 Section Four requires that any infringement of its
provisions be done by a majority of sixty-one MKs or by meeting the
requirements of the judicial limitation clause or both, something that
is not clear from the current case law on the subject.280 Furthermore,
the Continuity Law’s infringement upon the democratic nature of the
State, as guaranteed by Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty,
requires too that it will meet the requirements of the judicial
limitation clause.281 This also applies to the Continuity Law’s
infringements upon the status of the Knesset as the legislature of the
State.282
It is doubtful whether the Continuity Law can pass these tests.
The law was not enacted by a majority of sixty-one MKs. The harm it
causes outweighs its benefit, as follows from Parts IV and V, and as
such the law does not meet the third test of proportionality, which is a
cost-benefit balancing test.
278. The Continuity Law does not enjoy the Preservation of Laws Clause, which
prevents the courts from declaring statutes invalid if they were enacted prior to the enactment
of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty. See Basic Law, supra note 114. The current law
was passed in 1993, subsequent to the enactment of Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.
See generally HCJ 6055/95 Tzemach v. Minister of Security 53(5) PD 241 [1999] (Isr.).
279. The constitutional revolution also encompasses Basic Laws, which were enacted
prior to the United Mizrahi Bank decision. See, e.g., HCJ 212/03 Herut National Movement v.
CEC Chairman 57(1) PD 750 [2003] (Isr.). Thus, the Court may exercise judicial review based
on these Basic Laws, and not only based on the Basic Laws dealing with individual rights from
1992.
280. See EA 92/03 Mofaz v. 16th CEC Chairman 57(3) PD 793 [2003] (Isr.); see also
Rivka Weill, Did the Lawmaker Shoot a Cannon to Hit a Fly? On Proportionality in Law, 15
LAW & BUS. 337 (2012).
281. The criteria of the express Limitations Clause in art. 8 of Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty only need to be met in cases of limitations of rights. However, in my
opinion, limitation of values established in the Basic Law requires meeting the criteria of an
implied (judicial) Limitations Clause. The requirements of the implied (judicial) Limitations
Clause are similar to those of the express Limitations Clause and include the need to have a
proper purpose and meet proportionality tests.
282. For support of this view, see, e.g., HCJ 2605/05 Human Rights Division v. Finance
Minister 63(2) PD 545, 731 [2009] (Isr.) (Levi J.).
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VI. CONSTITUTIONALIZING CONTINUITY
This Part argues that if the Knesset elects to preserve continuity,
it should be reshaped in a way that preserves the benefit and
minimizes the harm. This is possible if use of the Continuity Law is
confined to complex, professional legal codes, which are not
controversial.283 Therefore, the application of the Continuity Law
should be stipulated on obtaining the consent of a greater majority
than sixty-one MKs. The Continuity Law should be further
formalized as a Basic Law rather than be codified by ordinary
legislation.
A. Codification in a Basic Law
When MK Nir-Rafalkes proposed adopting continuity, he
drafted it as an amendment to Section Thirty-Eight of Basic Law: The
Knesset.284 Section Thirty-Eight formalizes the extended validity of
enactments that are due to expire toward the end of the Knesset’s
term.285 MK Nir-Rafalkes wanted to formalize the extended validity
of bills in addition to the extended validity of enactments.
The Knesset held a debate on the question of whether the
Continuity Law should be formalized as part of the Basic Laws.286
Justice Minister Dov Yosef certainly recognized the constitutional
importance of the Law. Thus, for example, when he tried to convince
MK Moshe Unna, Chairman of the Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee, to expedite the handling of the Law, he wrote, “It seems
to me that since this law could impact the fate of many other laws, it
should take precedence over any other law on the agenda.”287 Dov
Yosef also rejected the idea of Dr. Uri Yadin, the first director of the
Legislation Department of the Ministry of Justice, to adopt continuity

283. For example, the Corporations Law (1990) passed its first reading in the Thirteenth
Knesset and was passed into law towards the end of the Fourteenth Knesset, and there was
great concern that if the law was not passed, all the work would be for naught. If there is any
place for the Continuity Law, then it is the Corporations Law that justifies continuity. I owe
this example to Uriel Procaccia.
284. See supra Part I.
285. “Enactments” are either law or bylaw. Interpretation Law, DMI 1, Art. 1.
286. 39 DK 1662 (1964) (Isr.) (MK Moshe Unna); id. at 1668 (MK Michael Hazani); see
also DK 112 (1962) (Isr.) (MKYisrael Shlomo Ben-Meir).
287. See Correspondence between Justice Minister Dov Yosef and Chairman of the
Constitution, Law and Justice committee, MK Moshe Unna (May 19, 1964), State Archive
GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
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in the Rules of Procedure, and not in a statute.288 He explained, “I do
not opine that such an important change should be introduced in
constitutional processes of the Knesset by amending the Knesset
Rules of Procedure, but by a law.”289 Similarly, his predecessor,
Justice Minister Rosen, explained that he thought that continuity
should be enacted in a law, as this is a matter of “major constitutional
importance.”290
Why then was the Continuity Law enacted as an ordinary law?
The overt answer of Justice Minister Dov Yosef was that it was
perhaps preferable to enact it as a Basic Law. However, this could be
postponed to a time when various matters regulated in the Rules of
Procedure would be formalized in a Basic Law.291
It seems that the unstated answer was apparently related to the
huge debate within the government on continuity. When Minister of
Religious Affairs Zerach Warhaftig opposed the Continuity Bill, he
also opposed the enforcement of coalition discipline with respect to it:
Clearly the [coalition] agreement assumes that the form of
government will be preserved, except for various changes on
which there is express consent. This, in my opinion, applies to
this bill. I view it as undermining the authority of the Knesset and
a fundamental change in its essence, and therefore the coalition
agreement does not apply.292

Naturally, the Justice Minister objected and asserted that
coalition discipline applies to this bill.293 Clearly, if the Continuity
Law had been enacted as a Basic Law rather than as an ordinary law,
the Minister of Religious Affairs’ argument that coalition discipline
should not be applied would have been further reinforced, and this
288. Yadin recommended this for tactical purposes. He reasoned that this was an easier
way to adopt the Continuity Law. See Correspondence between Dr. U. Yadin and Justice
Minister Dov Yosef (May 19, 1963), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
289. Correspondence between Justice Minister Dov Yosef and Dr. U. Yadin (May 21,
1963). State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
290. 32 DK 146 (1962) (Isr.) (Minister of Justice Rosen). In 1959, Justice Minister
Rosen’s opinion was different. In his response to the continuity bill proposed by MKs NirRafalkes and Harari, he opined that there was no need to pass a law in order to apply
continuity. Discontinuity is based on custom. Thus, it can be changed through the Knesset
Rules of Procedure. 25 DK 998 (1959) (Isr.) (Minister of Justice Rosen).
291. 39 DK 1687 (1964) (Isr.).
292. Correspondence from Minister of Religious Affairs to Minister of Justice (July 10,
1963), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.); see also Correspondence from Minister of Religious
Affairs to Minister of Justice (Jan. 15, 1964), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
293. Correspondence from the Justice Minister to the Minister of Religious Affairs (Dec.
24, 1963), State Archive GL–21275/12 (Isr.).
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would have negatively affected the Continuity Law.294 Actually, the
longstanding practice of Israel’s governments is not to apply coalition
discipline to amendments of Basic Laws.295
What are the implications of enacting the Continuity Law as an
ordinary law and not as a Basic Law? In my view, the Continuity
Law’s severe infringements of constitutional rights and values do not
pass constitutional scrutiny. Furthermore, some of the violations are
tantamount to a modification of the Basic Law: The Knesset which
requires an amendment of the Basic Law itself.296 The fact that
legislative processes are primarily regulated today in the Knesset’s
Rules of Procedure, and not in the Basic Laws, does not help the
Continuity Law. As long as these legislative processes do not clash
with constitutional rights and values, they do not raise the
constitutional problem that the Continuity Law raises.
B. Enactment by Broad Consensus
Not only should the Continuity Law have been enacted as part of
the Basic Laws, it also should have been enacted by a broad
consensus, and this was not the case. The Knesset conducted heated
debates in 1961 and 1964 on continuity. The government eventually
passed the law at a time of political instability. The opponents
accused the government of passing the law without a mandate.297
During the Thirteenth Knesset, the Knesset replaced the 1964
Continuity Law with a new law.298 What is interesting is that,
although the Ma’arach (“Alignment”) controlled the Government,
headed by Yitzhak Rabin, MK Hagai Merom from the Ma’arach
proposed the bill as an individual MK. There were apparently two
reasons for this: First, Rabin’s government was preoccupied with the
Oslo agreements during this period. Second, the government
discovered in 1992 the power of private legislation, by which the
1992 Basic Laws dealing with individual rights were enacted. It took
advantage of private legislation to pass its initiatives.299
294. The discontinuity principle is codified in various ways around the world. It may be
established in the constitution, custom, internal parliamentary rules of procedure, or, even less
frequently, in law. See Van Schagen, supra note 1, at 118-19.
295. See Weill, supra note 233.
296. United Mizrahi Bank, supra note 55, at 324.
297. See supra Part II.B.
298. 128 DK 2989 (1993) (Isr.).
299. See Maor, supra note 204, at 375.
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The Knesset held a debate on the first reading on February 1,
1993, and all five MKs present endorsed the bill.300 The text of the
proposal was passed verbatim, without any change, in the second and
third readings within two days of the first reading, and all seventeen
MKs present backed the bill.301 This was a hasty process supported by
only a few MKs. One of the MKs, David Magen from the Likud,
complained that if it were not for the rushed process, he would have
been happy to expand the application of continuity to all bills, even
those that only passed a preliminary reading.302 It is doubtful whether
this legislative history points to a broad and stable consensus on
continuity.
C. The Proper Content of Basic Law: Continuity
Should the Knesset decide to enact the Continuity Law as a
Basic Law, the contents of the Continuity Law should be reshaped to
minimize its harm. The application of continuity should be made
contingent on obtaining broad consensus of MKs, which would
guarantee that it is only applied to non-controversial, technical,
professional laws. In addition, a debate should be conducted
whenever continuity is applied, even if no opposition is raised. It
should also be mandatory to conduct a separate debate on each bill to
which the application of continuity is sought. There is room to
strengthen the standing of factions and individual MKs on the
question of the initiation of the application of continuity in order to
balance the government’s power in the Knesset. There is room to
require the government to respond to continuity application initiatives
in the plenum, rather than in the Knesset committees.
The application of continuity to bills presented for a first reading
after a Knesset becomes an outgoing Knesset should be prohibited. A
time limit should be set on the use of the continuity law after the new
government takes office. The government should be prohibited from
leveraging its consent to silence a debate on the contents of the law.
Whenever continuity is applied, all material must be presented to the
MKs before deliberating on the application of continuity. The
incoming Knesset committee should decide which committees are
authorized to initiate continuity. All these conditions are meant to
300. 128 DK 2989 (1993) (Isr.).
301. 128 DK 3055 (1993) (Isr.).
302. Id.
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limit the use of continuity, so that it becomes the exception, not the
rule, in the enactment of laws.
CONCLUSION
The study of continuity in legislative processes has been
neglected worldwide. It is apparently viewed as marginal, technical,
non-influential, and mainly, uninteresting. Yet, hidden behind the
technical façade of procedural law are decisions that shape the face of
the nation. This Article argues that the principle of discontinuity
should be regarded as one of democracy’s major tenets. By studying
the effects of continuity on the Israeli legislature, the Article reveals
the importance of the discontinuity principle prevalent in democratic
countries. The Article is especially relevant to US debates about
whether to treat the Senate as a continuing body, to British recent
endeavors to insert flexibility to their rigid discontinuity principle,
and to attempts to minimize the democratic deficit of the EU
Parliament.
The Article revealed discussions on the subject in the Knesset in
the 1960s, which were among the most fascinating ever held by the
Knesset on constitutional issues. The cautions of the Continuity
Law’s opponents were eventually realized in the problems Israel now
confronts. In this Article, I asserted that Israel’s rule of continuity
does not stand the test of constitutional scrutiny and should be
repealed. Continuity erodes core democratic values by reducing the
influence of elections on legislation. It shackles one legislature to the
legislative decisions of its predecessor. It expresses a majoritarian
view of democracy that prejudices the rights of the minority. It grants
precedence to longstanding MKs over new members in their power to
vote on laws. It strengthens the power of the government in the
legislature, while weakening the legislative committees and factions.
Against these pivotal violations, I concluded that the arguments of the
proponents of continuity do not stand up to scrutiny. Just the opposite:
Their arguments point to still other reasons why continuity should be
rejected. It is therefore my conclusion that the harms stemming from
continuity outweigh its benefits. Had it been subject to judicial
review, it should have been repealed. The Israeli experience with
continuity should serve as a cautionary tale to any country that either
operates under a rule of continuity or is seriously considering a
relaxation of its discontinuity principle.

